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Dramatic changes in the international system since the early nineties, namely the 
end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many 
to wonder whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, 
and engagement are viable against new U.S. threats—rogue states.  This thesis will 
examine U.S. efforts between 1986 and 2004 to convince Libya to cease its support for 
international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  U.S. influence strategy 
towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term success.  The compellence and 
deterrence policies established by President Reagan and strengthened by later 
administrations served to isolate Libya economically and diplomatically and set the 
conditions for successful conditional engagement.  Positive behavior change by Libya 
began first with the Clinton Administration’s introduction of conditional engagement.  
The Bush Administration, benefiting from years of Libyan isolation and the positive 
response to conditional engagement, continued to engage Libya in an incremental 
fashion.  Libya renounced its terrorist ties in August 2003 and weapons of mass 
destruction in December 2003.  Since then Tripoli has taken actionable steps to verify 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether it is possible to successfully 
apply a behavior modification strategy to rogue states.  The dramatic changes in the 
international system since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the 
more recent post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder 
whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and 
engagement are viable against new threats.  If these strategies are viable, how should they 
be used to influence the most immediate and pressing threats—rogue states trafficking in 
terrorism or weapons of mass destruction?  This thesis will examine United States’ 
efforts between 1986 and 2004 to convince Libya to cease its support for both 
international terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In 
this particular case the United States was attempting to convince the target state (Libya) 
to stop an action already underway (support for terrorism and production of WMD in 
existing facilities and with existing resources) and also deter future support and 
production.  As such, U.S. influence strategy necessarily combined, at minimum, 
compellence, efforts to stop an action already underway, and deterrence, efforts to 
prevent future action. Additionally, and as will be demonstrated in the case study 
chapters, the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations also used positive incentives 
in a conditional fashion after Tripoli demonstrated a willingness to change its behavior.  
A. ROGUE STATES, TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION 
Though there is not one accepted definition of a rogue state1, qualification for the 
designation generally includes the production or purchase of WMD and links to terrorist 
 
1 In his book, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak argues that the “rogue state” classification is highly political 
and has no basis in international law.  More specifically, the categorization is an expression of U.S. political objectives and 
perceptions, and is a reflection of U.S. approaches to international relations.  Quoting Alexander George, Litwak describes the rogue 
state categorization as being “employed by one or more great powers with a stake in the maintenance and orderly working of the 
international system.”  Ultimately, he argues, the categorization has no objective criteria and has been demonstrated to cause 
disagreement between the U.S. and its allies.  Robert Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War, 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 47-48.  Alexander George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in 
Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 48-49.  Based on the Alexander George definition, it 
can be argued that however politically-charged the term may be, the concept of “rogue states” is a lens through which the U.S. 
government views a particular category of states within the international system.  Since this thesis is written from the perspective of 
U.S. national security concerns and future policy-making, the term “rogue state” will be used with due consideration to reference and 
be consistent with the particular threat category articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002). 
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organizations.2  Rogue state terrorist activities include condoning, funding, or 
participating in terrorism.3  The U.S. government, arguably the largest proponent of the 
rogue state classification, defined the term in The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (September 2002).  In keeping with the literature, this Bush 
Administration policy document identified rogue states as a unique threat to U.S. national 
security based primarily on WMD capabilities and links to terrorist organizations.  In 
addition to describing the threat posed by rogue states, NSS 2002 also articulates the 
characteristics of those same states.  Rogue states are described as nation-states that: 
• Brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the 
personal gain of the rulers; 
• Display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and 
callously violate international treaties to which they are a party; 
• Are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other 
advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to 
achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; 
• Sponsor terrorism around the globe; and 
• Reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for 
which it stands.4 
 
On several levels, then, rogues states pose a particular threat to U.S. interests and 
the international community at large.  First, they reject international oversight and 
controls on WMD.  Second, they have demonstrated a willingness to pursue the 
development and/or weaponization of weapons of mass destruction.  Third, rogue states 
have links to terrorist organizations, be it in providing safe-haven for terrorist training 
and operations, or through financial support.   
1. Terrorism 
The concept of terrorism is not new, and in this post-9/11 age has increasingly 
become part of the common parlance.  To be clear, though, it may be helpful to review 
U.S. government definitions of terrorism, as these will be applicable to policy discussion 
 
2 Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation, (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999), vii-viii.   Of note, 
Tanter also includes the third qualification of possessing large conventional forces. 
3 Ibid.   
4 President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C., Sep 2002), 13-
14.  
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in the following chapters.  Since 1983, the U.S. government has defined terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets 
by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”  
The term “noncombatants” refers to civilians and unarmed or off-duty military 
personnel.5  Further, international terrorism refers to terrorism “involving citizens of the 
territory of more than one country.” Terrorist group refers to “any group practicing, or 
that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.”6  State sponsors of 
terrorism are described as those that provide funding, weapons, materials, and/or social 
or political space for planning and conducting operations.7  Of note is the fact that the 
U.S. government currently designates six countries as state sponsors of terrorism:  Libya, 
Sudan, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Iran.8  
The National Security Strategy of 2002 and other key documents such as the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Feb 2003) and Patterns of Global Terrorism 
clearly set forth the U.S. position and policy on terrorism.  The United States considers 
terrorism one of the primary threats to its national security and many resources have been 
and will be allocated to prosecuting and ultimately bringing this worldwide problem 
under control.  Instead of further discussion on the threat of terrorism, it may instead be 
more useful to briefly consider why rogue states use terrorism as a tool of their foreign 
policy.   First, terrorism, much like weapons of mass destruction, can be viewed as an 
asymmetric tool at the disposal of rogue regimes.  Though they may not maintain 
conventional forces sufficient to impact larger nation-states, terrorism provides a 
mechanism through which rogue states can affect other groups or states.  Second, 
terrorism leaves an unclear calling card.  Though it may be possible to determine what 
group perpetrated the act, it is sometimes more difficult to discern whether the act was 
facilitated by a state working through the terrorist group.  This allows for some level of 
plausible deniability in the action—again allowing a rogue state to affect another state 
while maintaining some level of secrecy, however thin.  Third, terrorism, as in the case of 
 
5 The U.S. government definition above is based on Title 22 of United States Code. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of 
Global Terrorism 2001. (Washington, D.C., May 2002), xvi. 
6 Ibid. 
7 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Washington, D.C., Apr 2003), 76. 
8 U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. (Washington, D.C., Apr 2004), 85-93. 
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Libya, may in fact be considered by the rogue state to be a legitimate ideological tool in 
support of a particular cause.  For years Muammar Qadhafi sponsored insurgencies and 
various terrorist groups around the world in the furtherance of his particular brand of 
socialist, anti-imperialist revolution.9  
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The term “weapons of mass destruction” is generally applied to nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons.  While all WMD proliferation is considered 
undesirable, the U.S. government views potential proliferation to and from rogue states 
with particular concern.10  The threat stems fundamentally from lack of transparency and 
uncertainty.  Unlike other states that have agreed to and subsequently abide by 
international norms and agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC), states such as North 
Korea and Syria reject some international treaties and behave in ways that create strong 
suspicions about their compliance with others.11  Further, these same states have been 
suspected of buying and selling weapons, specifically ballistic missile technology, which 
 
9 Beginning in the late seventies, Qadhafi began exporting his revolutionary ideals in support of leftist, anti-Western movements 
in South and Central America.  The laundry list of insurgent and militant groups supported by Qadhafi encompassed most of the 
Western hemisphere and included the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (including provision of weapons and terrorist training), M-19 guerillas 
of Colombia, Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru, and countless other groups in Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and throughout the Caribbean.  
Qadhafi even aligned himself with Syria and Iran during the Iran-Iraq war to coordinate both support for South Yemen, then a Soviet 
satellite, and anti-Israeli, anti-U.S. activities. Brian L. Davis, Qadhafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New 
York: Praeger, 1990), 18. 
10 Disagreement exists over whether biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons should all three be included under the rubric of 
“WMD.” Wolfgang Panofsky argues that linking biological and chemical weapons with nuclear weapons under the category of 
“WMD” diminishes the primacy of the nuclear threat, which should have priority in U.S. security issues; “Dismantling the Concept of 
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’,” Arms Control Today (April 1998); available from 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_04/wkhp98.asp; accessed 25 November 2003.    The author will use “WMD” in a general sense 
to refer to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons because it is consistent with the commonly held meaning of the acronym 
“WMD” and also because biological and chemical weapons are arguably maintained by states who cannot afford or have not yet 
developed nuclear weapons for the same purposes that other states maintain nuclear weapons.  See Alan Dowty, “Making ‘No First 
Use’ Work: Bring all WMD Inside the Tent,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2001), 80. 
11 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).  North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, 
has never signed the CWC, and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in Mar 1987.  Syria ratified the 
NPT in September 1969, has not signed the CWC, and signed the BTWC in April 1972.  Inventory of International Nonproliferation 
Organizations and Regimes; available from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/npt.pdf; accessed 4 November 2003. 
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could be configured to deliver WMD.12  In any case, because these states largely reject 
international norms and effective controls on their WMD and because they maintain a 
historical tendency to trade in possible WMD delivery technologies, uncertainty over 
their willingness to employ or sell WMD to others remains a factor in the international 
system. 
Robert Art, in his writing on the strategy of selective engagement, argues that the 
coupling of rogue states, terrorists, and WMD is one of the greatest threats to the United 
States. 13  He argues that the proliferation of WMD is inherently bad for the following 
two reasons.  First, as WMD materials proliferate, so does the potential for other rogue 
states and/or terrorists to gain access to those materials.  Second, WMD in the hands of 
rogue states may mistakenly embolden their leaders to strike out against U.S. interests.14  
Given the threat that rogue states pose, it is important that the United States be 
able to successfully influence rogue state behavior.  In a best-case scenario, a successful 
influence strategy could make it unnecessary for the United States to resort to war and its 
associated costs and risks to influence international outcomes.  It is, therefore, within the 
U.S. national interest to maintain an ability to influence rogue state behavior.  
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
In the largest context, this thesis seeks to join the debate over which strategies are 
best to affect state policies that pose threats to U.S. national security.  Among the 
spectrum of competing strategies aimed at influencing another state’s behavior are 
engagement, reassurance, dissuasion, deterrence, compellence, and pre-emptive or 
coercive war.  There is debate in the literature as to the continued relevance of some of 
these strategies in the post-Cold War international system.  Deterrence strategy, steeped 
in Cold War paradigms, was shaped by the need to prevent a U.S.-Soviet nuclear 
exchange.  Coercive diplomacy, a frequently used form of U.S. compellence strategy, 
 
12 It is the CIA’s assessment that North Korea has “demonstrated a willingness to sell complete [ballistic missile] systems and 
components” to other states.  Furthermore, the CIA assesses that the export of ballistic missiles and related weapons technologies are 
one of the primary sources of hard currency for the Kim Chong Il regime.  Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the 
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 
June 2003; available from http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#5; accessed 10 November 2003.  
13 Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated:  The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in Strategy and Force Planning, ed. Strategy 
and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), 188. 
14 Ibid., 190-191. 
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though considered highly flexible, has an assessed success rate of only 32%.15  
Engagement, often mistakenly equated with appeasement in the minds of policy makers, 
is many times avoided as viable influence strategy.  Given this concern over the 
relevance of deterrence and the effectiveness of compellence and engagement, this thesis 
seeks more specifically to determine whether these three are strategies that successfully 
influence rogue state behavior with respect to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction 
production.     
To answer the proposed research question, this thesis will examine U.S. efforts to 
influence rogue state behavior through four different U.S. presidential administrations.  In 
the four case studies, the United States attempted to influence Libya to two outcomes: 
first, the cessation of their support for international terrorism, and second, the cessation of 
any existing production of WMD.  An assumption of this thesis is that given the interest 
the United States has very clearly demonstrated in countering both terrorism and the 
proliferation of WMD, their intent with Libya was not singularly to have Tripoli cease 
current support for terrorism or production of WMD; rather, implicit in and included in 
the compellence message was deterrence of future support of terrorism or production of 
WMD.   
The Libya case was selected for a variety of reasons:  (1) Libya fits the rogue state 
profile articulated by the United States and has been treated as such through multiple U.S. 
presidential administrations; (2) Tripoli was actively engaged in behavior that was a clear 
threat to the United States, namely ideologically-based terrorism against U.S. persons and 
interests; (3) in the midst of supporting terrorism, Libya established a chemical weapons 
program; (4) the period in which the United States applied an influence strategy against 
Libya spans multiple U.S. administrations, specifically those of Presidents Ronald 
Reagan through George W. Bush—allowing for analysis of the influence exchange of an 
extended period of time; and (5) the U.S. policy toward Libya was both successful and 
unsuccessful.  In the short-term, the U.S. was not able to stop Libya from supporting 
international terrorism or building up a chemical weapons capability.  In the longer term, 
however, Tripoli denounced their support for terrorism and the production and 
 
15 Robert J. Art, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 
387. 
7 
proliferation of WMD.  This contrast makes it possible to compare different time periods 
with different results. 
This thesis will demonstrate that the U.S. applied a strategy of compellence, 
deterrence and engagement against Libya.  After a period of time during which the 
primary strategy was deterrence and compellence, this strategy was seasoned lightly with 
positive incentives.  Engagement, or the use of positive incentives, began during the 
Clinton Administration and continued selectively, and only after signs of willingness to 
change on the part of Qadhafi, with the George W. Bush Administration.  By 19 
December 2003, 18 years after the establishment of U.S. economic sanctions, the Libyan 
government had renounced their support of both terrorism and WMD.  Furthermore, 
since the December 2003 announcement, the Libyan government has taken viable steps 
to demonstrate their commitment to this decision, and their actions have been met with 
U.S. and international rewards.   
Chapter II will provide a comprehensive literature review of the major influence 
theories encountered in this thesis as well as establish a methodological foundation for 
analysis.  Chapters III through VI will analyze U.S. policy by presidential administrations 
(1986-2004), examining the influence exchange between the U.S. and Libyan 
governments to determine what kind of strategy was applied and whether it was 
successful or unsuccessful.  In evaluating the role of U.S. policy in the behavior change, 
chapter VII will examine other factors besides the U.S. influence strategy which may 
have contributed to Tripoli’s behavioral change.  These factors may include, among 
others, the application and effectiveness of UN sanctions, ideological change in the world 
political system, and domestic (Libyan) political factors.  Finally, this thesis will 
conclude with recommendations for future U.S. policymaking.  
As will be demonstrated in the next few chapters, U.S. compellence and 
deterrence policy was strengthened by the application of UN sanctions.  Together the 
combined sanctions set the conditions for Tripoli’s behavior change.  Substantive 
changes in Libyan policy regarding terrorism and weapons of mass destruction did not 
begin, however, until the U.S. began a policy of limited and incremental conditional 
engagement.  Future policymakers should take from this case study an understanding that 
8 
punitive measures such as sanctions, especially when backed by the international 
community, can be successful in achieving a limited goal of diplomatic and economic 
isolation.  However, punitive measures alone may not be sufficient to facilitate 
recognizable and concrete behavior change in a target state.  As this case demonstrates, 
when the right conditions have been established through punitive measures like sanctions, 
positive incentives offered in a conditional and incrementalized fashion can both build 
trust between the influencing and target state and move the target state towards 






                                                
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To begin to answer the research question established in chapter I and to establish 
a solid methodological framework for the thesis, it is necessary to first review the 
existing literature on influence strategies, namely deterrence, compellence and 
engagement.  Some of the questions that will be answered in this chapter are:  What are 
deterrence, compellence, and engagement? How do we determine when one of these 
influence strategies is being applied to a nation-state?  How do we evaluate success and 
failure for these strategies? 
A. DETERRENCE 
The concept of deterrence can be viewed as both a cost-benefit analysis and as a 
language communicated between at least two actors.  Both of these perspectives on 
deterrence are essential to deterrence as a type of strategic influence strategy and both 
will be considered in this thesis.   
In their book Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:  Theory and Practice, 
Alexander George and Richard Smoke describe the basic cost-benefit analysis of the 
model of deterrence.  In this case, deterrence works when the adversary, or target state,16 
determines that its costs plus risks of a potential action outweigh the benefits or 
advantages of that action.  Mathematically, the model would look like this: 
C+R>B, where C=cost, R=risk, and B=benefits.17
In theory, a deterrence strategy should be aimed at increasing the perceived aggregate 
costs to the target state by increasing the probability of influencing state18 action 
(punitive action, usually in the form of military force).19   
 
16 There are multiple terms used in the literature to describe the two states involved in a deterrence or compellence situation.  
Heretofore, and for the purposes of remaining as objective as possible in this analysis, the term influencing state will be used to 
describe the state that applies a strategy of deterrence or compellence and the term target state to describe the state against which the 
strategy is being applied. 
17 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia, 
1974), 60. 
18 See note 1. 
19 Though deterrence by denial is a viable deterrence strategy, this thesis will concentrate on deterrence by threat of punishment, 
be it diplomatic, economic, or military force. 
10 
                                                
In addition to the cost-benefit nature, deterrence is also a language communicated 
between states or actors.  In this case, it is critical that the costs of a certain action (C+R) 
be communicated successfully and completely from one state to another.  In deterrence 
literature, there are four elements considered requisite to successfully applying a 
deterrence strategy to a challenger.  Lebow and Stein articulate these four elements as 
defining the unacceptable behavior, signaling publicly a willingness to punish or restrain 
the target state for the action, demonstration of a commitment to take action, and finally 
the maintenance of some level of capability to actualize the threatened punishment. 20 
Through these four elements, an influencing state determines its position and 
communicates that position to the target state.  As will be discussed below, these four 
elements are significant enough that Lebow and Stein use them as criteria to determine if 
an influencing state used deterrence in a particular situation.21   
1. Types of Deterrence 
There are multiple types of deterrence and a brief evaluation of those types is 
warranted.  Deterrence, as defined above, is a cost-benefit analysis that is communicated 
from one state to another in an effort to prevent a certain course of action.  Though it is 
frequently used in a security context to refer to military actions or deployments, it can 
also be used to refer to a particular behavior outside the scope of use of conventional 
military forces that threatens or is perceived as threatening another state’s national 
security.22  Deterrence can be categorized as general deterrence, immediate deterrence, 
extended deterrence, or direct deterrence.  In this case, general deterrence is a reflection 
of the power relationships between target state and influencing state such that one or both 
is preventing military aggression from the other.  An example of this kind of deterrence 
would be the U.S.-U.S.S.R relationship during the cold war and the effort on both sides to 
prevent nuclear exchange.  Immediate deterrence occurs when a state challenges another 
state’s established commitment to a particular course of action.  An example of this is 
U.S. efforts in 1962 to prevent further emplacement of Soviet ICBMs in Cuba.  Extended 
deterrence involves three actors, attacker (target state), protégé, and influencing state, 
 
20 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics 42, Issue 3 (Apr 
1990): 344.  Also, John Orme, “Deterrence Failures: A Second Look,” International Security 11, Issue 4 (Spring 1987): 96. 
21 Lebow and Stein, 344. 
22 Ibid., 336.   
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where the influencing state attempts to prevent the target state from moving against the 
protégé state.23  The most obvious example of this is U.S. efforts to prevent an attack by 
mainland China on Taiwan.  Finally, direct deterrence seeks to prevent an attack on the 
influencing state’s homeland.24  A recent example of direct deterrence is the George W. 
Bush Administration’s efforts to deter a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland by 
threatening state sponsors of terrorism.  
2. Complexities in Analyzing Cases of Deterrence 
Despite what Achen and Snidal call the “logical cohesion” of rational deterrence 
theory as well as its historical record of guiding U.S. foreign policymaking, much has 
been written about the complexities of analyzing cases of deterrence.25   There are a few 
complexities in particular that must be discussed here, as they will provide the 
methodological framework for evaluating the case studies in this thesis.  The two 
complexities to be discussed are determining intentions of the actor-state (be it the target 
or influencing state) and evaluating deterrence success and failure.  
a. Determining Intentions 
Determining intentions of the actors in a deterrence situation is important 
both to proving deterrence was applied in a particular situation and in evaluating the 
relative success of the strategy.  Intention here refers to the target state’s intent to attack, 
or take a particular action, and the influencing state’s attempt to deter that action.  There 
is disagreement in the literature about how to determine a state’s intention in an 
encounter.  For example, Huth and Russett see indicators such as deployment of military 
forces as expressing a state’s intent to act in a hostile manner.  Lebow and Stein disagree, 
arguing that there are reasons other than offensive operations for which a state will 
 
23 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36, Issue 4 (Jul 
1984): 496.  Huth and Russett describe this protégé or third party state as “an ally, a client state, or a friendly neutral.” 
24 Lebow and Stein articulate these distinctions in deterrence, 336.  
25 Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics 41, 
Issue 2 (Jan 1989): 144, 153.  Also, Lebow and Stein provide an excellent review of the many complexities and challenges to 
analyzing the application of deterrence theory.  Their list includes: the importance of examining all deterrence situations from the 
perspective of each actor-state, as each will have different role-perceptions which will effect how they perceive others and act on those 
perceptions; the importance of understanding the context in which deterrence takes place, including both the immediate situation and 
the historical relationship between the actors involved; the robust data requirements to determine an actor-state’s intent; and a 
tendency on the part of the analyst toward bias in selection of deterrence cases to examine and the designation of deterrence roles 
(influencing state vs. target state), 342-355. 
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deploy its military.26  Lebow and Stein argue further that for a case to be considered a 
deterrence encounter there must be evidence to prove that the attacker intended to attack 
and the defender attempted to defend.  They admit that this criterion is rigorous and that 
in the case of the target state, evidence of intent to attack may not be available or that the 
policymakers themselves may not have been certain during the situation what course of 
action they would have taken.27  Lebow and Stein do, however, list the criteria for 
evidence that an influencing state attempted to deter action by the target state; these 
criteria are the same four deterrence elements listed above: identification of unacceptable 
behavior, public signaling of commitment to punish the target state, demonstration of 
resolve, and credible capability to enact the threatened punishment.28
As previously discussed, though much of deterrence literature is applied in 
a specific military context, it is equally applicable in the cases examined here as an effort 
of one state to influence the action of another in the interest of the former’s national 
security.  A summation of the methodological choices will follow the discussions of 
compellence and engagement. 
b. Evaluating Deterrence Success and Failure 
As previously mentioned, establishing the intention of the target state and 
influencing state is important in evaluating the relative success of the deterrence strategy.  
Again there is disagreement in the literature over what constitutes deterrence success and 
failure.  Huth and Russett argue that absence of attack, or the target state not taking the 
action being deterred, does not equate to deterrence success.29  Again they return to the 
concept of intention and the importance of establishing how the state intended to act to 
determining deterrence success or failure.  They provide several reasons other than 
successful deterrence by the influencing state to explain why an attack may not take 
place, including a change in priority by the decision-maker or a change in the actual 
decision-maker.30  Huth and Russett conclude, however, that where deterrence takes 
place and is successful it is primarily due to the threat communicated by the influencing  
26 Lebow and Stein also argue that the historical record also supports this argument, 342. 
27 Ibid., 343. 
28 Ibid., 344. 
29 Huth and Russett, 497. 
30 Ibid., 497. 
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state.31 In cases of deterrence failure, Huth and Russett point to several possible 
explanations, all of which can be viewed from the perspective of both target state and 
influencing state:  misperception of the deterrent threat (did the influencing state 
communicate the threat succinctly and did the target state understand the threat?), 
credibility of the threat (did the influencing state pose a credible threat and did the target 
state believe the threat to be credible?), cost-benefit analysis of the action (did the 
influencing state make clear the costs and risks associated with the challengers action 
outweigh the benefits and did the target state consider the cost plus risk to be more than 
the benefit of taking the action?).  Lebow and Stein view deterrence failure as occurring 
when either the target state commits the action being deterred or when the target state 
persuades the influencing state to give up its commitment to a certain course of action.32 
Lebow and Stein return to intention to determine deterrence success, arguing that the 
analyst must prove a target state considered a course of action but was convinced by the 
influencing state’s threat to change that course of action.33
With respect to deterrence success and failure in the case of rogue states, 
Robert Art argues that rogue states in particular may be more difficult to deter than other 
nation-states.  He provides the following reasons for this difficulty:  rogue states are 
highly motivated to achieve their objectives, making them more inclined to use force to 
ensure particular outcomes; rogue states are less inclined to be moved by the suffering of 
their populace or others in the face of the perceived benefit of achieving their objectives; 
and finally, rogue states are prone to misperceive or ignore another state’s threats.34  In 
particular, if rogue states view asymmetric tactics and capabilities, such as terrorism and 
WMD, as central to their overall political strategy they will both be hard to deter and 
more willing to use those same weapons.35  If rogue states are indeed more difficult to 
deter, for these reasons or others, then the influencing state may experience a higher rate 
of deterrence failure.  In any case, the importance of influencing rogue state behavior 
with respect to weapons of mass destruction in particular can not be underestimated. As  
31 Ibid., 497. 
32 Lebow and Stein, 344. 
33 Ibid., 345. 
34 Art, 2000, 188-189. 
35 Ibid., 189. 
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previously discussed in chapter I, rogue states may maintain ideological and other links to 
terrorist organizations.  These same states, furthermore, are often assessed as a potential 
link in the chain of terrorist acquisition of WMD.  Convincing them to cease production 
and proliferation may prevent an even more difficult or perhaps impossible influence 
exchange—deterring terrorist use of WMD.  Art argues that though it may be challenging 
to successfully deter rogues states, it is even more difficult to deter terrorists.  
Furthermore, deterring terrorists becomes all the more critical as data indicates an 
increase since 1980 in the numbers of lethal, mass casualty-oriented terrorist attacks.36 
“Deterring terrorists becomes nearly impossible if they are hell-bent only on revenge. In 
that case they have no need to identify themselves, and if there is no return address, there 
is no chance for retaliation.  Deterrence, after all, is the threat to retaliate.”37
B. COMPELLENCE 
In contrast with deterrence, which tries to influence a target state to not take a 
particular course of action, compellence seeks to influence a target state to take an action.  
Based on the initial work of Thomas Shelling and later Alexander George and Robert 
Art, compellence is generally understood to be a behavior-modification strategy that 
attempts to persuade a target state to take a particular course of action, often in reference 
to “an encroachment already undertaken.”38  More specifically, the influencing state is 
attempting to persuade the target state to: (1) take a course of action not currently being 
taken, (2) stop taking a course of action currently underway, or (3) undo or reverse a 
course of action.39 In each case, the target state is being persuaded to take some kind of 
action that will change the status quo. 
In the literature, the concept of compellence is often used interchangeably with 
coercion or coercive diplomacy and, given the connotations of those terms, it is important 
to understand that compellence and coercive diplomacy do not rely strictly on military 
force to achieve behavior modification.  Robert Art, in his book The United States and 
 
36 See Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypothesis,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer, 
1997): 45, 48. 
37 Art, 2000, 190. 
38 Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5. 
39 (1) and (2) from Art, 2003, 7-8; (2) and (3) from George, 1991, 6. 
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Coercive Diplomacy, describes coercion as including a spectrum of influence-leveraging 
that ranges from positive inducements to coercion without the use of force (economic 
sanctions) to full-scale war.40  Alexander George concurs, emphasizing the role of 
persuasion over “bludgeoning” in the use of compellence and as such the use of 
appropriate mechanisms to persuade: 
Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the adversary to cease its 
aggression rather than bludgeon him with military force into 
stopping…Threats or quite limited use of force are closely coordinated 
with appropriate diplomatic communications to the opponent.  Important 
signaling, bargaining, and negotiating components are built into the 
strategy of coercive diplomacy.41
 
Both Art and George highlight coercive diplomacy as a type of compellence 
strategy historically used by the United States in its efforts to effect behavior change in 
other states.  The concept of coercive diplomacy includes, at minimum, the threat of use 
or the limited use of force.42  Of note, both George and Art allow for the use of positive 
inducements and assurances in conjunction with the use of force during coercive 
diplomacy. 43   In fact, the use of positive inducements in conjunction with force can 
enhance the overall effectiveness of a coercive diplomacy strategy, “…what the 
threatened stick cannot achieve by itself, unless it is a very formidable one, may possibly 
be achieved by combining it with a carrot.”44   It is important to note that though coercive 
diplomacy can include positive inducements and other influence-leveraging tactics, it 
relies fundamentally upon the threat and/or use of force to achieve its outcomes.   
 
40 Robert J. Art, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 6-
7. 
41 Alexander George, “Foreword” in Art, 2003, vii.   
42 Art defines threat of force as involving actions that enhance the credibility of the influencer’s rhetoric.  Actions may include 
mobilizing and deploying military forces or simply issuing verbal warnings.   Limited war here can mean either “exemplary use of 
force” or “limited use of force” as defined on pages 9-10.  Exemplary force is usually a one-time demonstration of force that actualizes 
the seriousness of the influencer’s threat of force.  Limited force is an escalation from exemplary force and may involve the use of 
force up to the “boundary” to war.  Also, Art distinguishes between coercive diplomacy and coercive attempts.  The former includes at 
minimum the threat of use or the limited use of force; the latter includes the use of influence levers that do not involve force, for 
example only using economic sanctions, or only withholding some benefit from the target state, 2003, 7. 
43 Ibid., 7. 
44 George, 1991, 11. 
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Art’s work in the above mentioned book is in many ways a continuation of 
George’s research on the relative success of U.S. attempts at coercive diplomacy.  
Collectively the two authors examine twenty-two cases of U.S. coercive diplomacy 
between 1930 and 2001 and conclude that coercive diplomacy consistently fails more 
often than it succeeds.45  
1. Deterrence and Compellence 
As previously established, deterrence and compellence are distinctly different 
influence strategies.  Deterrence seeks a continuation of the status quo in that it seeks to 
persuade the target state to not take a particular action.  Compellence on the other hand 
seeks to persuade the target state to take a particular action.  According to Huth and 
Russett, in a traditional deterrence situation, deterrence is the strategy applied prior to the 
commencement of any military action between states.  Once military action has been 
initiated by the target state (classic deterrence failure), the influencing state’s strategy 
turns from deterrence to compellence, or the use of force to stop an action already 
underway.46   
Though different in their intended outcomes, both influence strategies typically 
rely on force to achieve their purposes.  Deterrence and compellence both threaten the 
use of force yet only in cases of compellence is the limited use of that force considered a 
success of the strategy.  Furthermore, deterrence situations can become compellence 
situations in two cases.  First, if deterrence fails and the target state takes the action being 
deterred, the influencing state can either concede (risking the loss of credibility) or use 
force to back up the original deterrent threat.  If the influencing state chooses the latter 
option, the deterrence threat becomes a compellence situation involving the use of force.  
Second, an influencing state may choose to strengthen a deterrence threat by a limited use 
of force.  In this case, a deterrence situation becomes a coercive situation for the purpose 
of strengthening the deterrent threat.47   
 
45 Art concludes that in their combined twenty-two case studies spanning seventy years of U.S. compellence history that 
coercive diplomacy has been successful in only 32% of cases in which it is used.  Coercive diplomacy fails in 45% of cases, has 
ambiguous results 14% of the cases, and has mixed results 9% of the cases, 2003, 12. 
46 Huth and Russett, 498.  
47 Art, 2003, 8. 
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A critical similarity between deterrence and compellence is that they both assume 
rationality on the part of the influencing and target states.48 Specifically, there is an 
assumption that the target state will accurately perceive the threat and attempt to weigh 
the costs and benefits of the targeted action.  This is arguably one of the greatest 
weaknesses of these two influence strategies and may be particularly problematic for the 
successful application of these strategies to rogue states.  In her case study of the U.S. 
deterrence and compellence strategies applied to Iraq in 1990-1991, Janice Gross Stein 
argues the United States crafted a textbook compellence strategy that ultimately failed 
due to the “strategic judgments” of Saddam Hussein.  She concludes that an effective 
strategy on the part of the influencing state is only one half of the equation: “An 
effectively designed strategy is a necessary but insufficient component of successful 
crisis prevention and management.” 49  To be successful, a deterrence or compellence 
strategy must be both effectively crafted by the influencing state and correctly perceived 
by the target state. 
2. Communicating Compellence 
As with a deterrence encounter, coercive diplomacy requires communication 
between the influencing state and the target state.  According to George, a compellence 
encounter involves both words and actions.  Depending on how they are used together, 
words and actions can work together to provide credibility for the threat and to clarify the 
influencing state’s resolve.  Words include “verbal messages to the opponent” such as the 
various types and levels of ultimatums.50  Actions include “significant nonverbal 
communications or signaling” through movement of military forces and other diplomatic-
political actions.51  George concludes that though the coupling of words and actions is 
highly situation dependent, their use is critical to the outcome of a coercive diplomacy 
situation.52
 
48 George, 1991, 4. 
49 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence or Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?,” International Security 
17, No. 2 (Autumn, 1992): 177. 
50 George describes four types of ultimatums; decreasing in intensity of demand, urgency, and threat, they include the full-
fledged ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the “try-and see-approach,” and the “gradual turning of the screw.”  See George, 1991, 7-9. 
51 Ibid., 9. 
52 Ibid., 10. 
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3. Evaluating Compellence Success and Failure 
Like deterrence, the success of compellence depends largely on two central 
elements:  (1) the ability of the influencing state to communicate effectively and credibly 
to the target state the costs and risks of either taking or not taking a particular course of 
action, and (2) the ability of the target state to rationally conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
and decide in a benefit-maximizing way.  Beyond this theoretical similarity, compellence 
is generally held in the literature to be more difficult than deterrence.  Robert Art 
provides four primary reasons why it is difficult to successfully use coercive diplomacy 
and subsequently why compellence is prone to failure.  First, as mentioned above, 
compellence is held to be more difficult than deterrence.  The reason for this is that in 
deterrence, the target state is being influenced to not take an action, whereas in 
compellence, the target state is being influenced to take an action.  Art notes that in a 
deterrence situation, the target state can comply with the influencing state’s demand and 
still save face by virtue of plausible deniability (target state claims to have never intended 
to change status quo in the first place) or by appearing to ignore the influencing state’s 
threat while not changing the status quo.  This same prestige saving on the international 
stage is not possible with compellence “because overt submission is required.”53  Second, 
coercive diplomacy is inherently a risk strategy, promising future punishment for the 
target state in the absence of compliance with the influencer’s demands.  Risk strategies 
are problematic because they require the target state to determine that the cost of the 
future punishment outweighs the current benefits of the action.  In addition to being 
difficult to create a sufficiently bad future threat in the mind of the target state decision 
makers, humans tend cognitively to “discount the future” and value the present more.54  
Furthermore, risk strategies tend to be applied incrementally, resulting in the unintended 
consequences of allowing the target state to adjust to the punishment and garner public 
support for resisting the influencer’s demand.55  Third, coercive diplomacy is difficult 
because it is hard to estimate the level of resolve of either state and this resolve ultimately 
 
53 Art, 2003, 362. 
54 Ibid., 362-364. 
55 Ibid., 363. 
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may change during the course of the engagement between the two states.  Finally, 
credibility and power issues are at stake for the target state in a compellence situation.  
Acquiescing to the influencing state’s demands may cause a loss of power and credibility 
in the target state by resulting in more demands or encouraging other states to make 
demands on the target state.  The target state’s decisions may influence its reputation and 
bargaining position in future foreign policy situations.56   
Though compellence is considered more difficult than deterrence, and though 
coercive diplomacy statistically results in failure more often than success, George and Art 
both identify conditions under which coercive diplomacy can be successful.  The seven 
conditions that contribute to the success of coercive diplomacy are: 
• Influencing state’s clarity in defining the objective being sought.  
• Influencing state’s determination to act. 
• Asymmetry of motivation, or greater motivation to prevail by the 
influencing state when compared to the target state’s motivation to resist. 
• Influencing state’s communicated sense of urgency for compliance by the 
target state. 
• Adequate domestic and international support for influencing state. 
• Target state’s fear of unacceptable escalation. 
• Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis. 
 
George argues that the most critical of these conditions are those that deal with 
the target state’s perception of the crisis situation:  asymmetry of motivation in favor of 
the influencing state, fear of unacceptable escalation, and time urgency for compliance.57  
Of note, the corollary to this emphasis on the perception of the target state is the potential 
for misperception and irrationality to interfere with the conditions being set forth by the 
influencing state, and ultimately cause the failure of coercive diplomacy.58  Though the 
influencing state cannot completely control the misperception and miscalculation on the 
part of the target state, to maximize the potential for successful compellence, the 
 
56 Ibid., 366. 
57 George, 1991, 81.  Art argues the two most critical conditions for successful coercive diplomacy are the target’s fear of 
unacceptable escalation and the asymmetry of motivation in favor of the influencing state, 2003, 371-372. 
58 George, 1991, 81. 
influencing state’s decision makers should emphasize the three perception-oriented 
conditions above. 
C. ENGAGEMENT    
In his book, Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence, James 
W. Davis argues that for too long influence theory has focused on deterrence and the use 
of threats as the ultimate tool of inducing state behavior change.  Instead, a wider theory 
of influence is needed that incorporates promises where appropriate.  In making the 
distinction between threats and promises, he and others have argued that influence 
strategy, to be successful, must be tailored to the motivations of the target state: target 
states motivated by aggression or the desire for gain tend to be best influenced by threats 
(deterrence and compellence), target states attempting to avoid loss, or vulnerabilities, are 
the most difficult to deter and are best influenced by assurances or promises 
(engagement).59  This tendency is summarized in the illustration below. 60   
 
Figure 1.   [Motivation Matrix (After: Matrix)]  
 
The use of threats against a target state who is motivated by the desire to avoid 
loss can cause the target state decision-maker(s) to take increased risks in their foreign 
policy behavior, thus leading to a spiral toward unacceptable consequences for both 
states.  Likewise, the use of promises to influence a state motivated by the desire to gain 
tends to lead to increased demands by the target state and temporary or no change of 
behavior.61
                                                 
59 James W. Davis, Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence, (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000), 5.  Also, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), ix. 




                                                
Given this need for an examination of the role of promises in state behavior 
change, it is necessary to examine a third influence strategy that emphasizes positive 
inducements or incentives—engagement.   In their book Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, 
Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Haass and O’Sullivan define engagement as an influence 
strategy that leverages positive incentives to induce behavior change in a target state. 62  
Though this strategy can, like deterrence or compellence, be used in isolation, it may also 
be used to complement other strategies by providing “carrots” that catalyze behavioral 
change in the target state.  Their overall conclusion is not that engagement should be used 
more frequently, rather that it should be given due consideration among other influence 
strategies and applied in situations where it is the best option for the influencing state.63   
There are two primary types of engagement:  unconditional and conditional.  
Unconditional engagement offers positive incentives with no requirement for reciprocal 
or responsive actions on the part of the target state.64  Often, unconditional engagement is 
used to lay the groundwork for future influence opportunities.  In these cases, if the target 
state responds favorably to the unconditional engagement, then cooperation between the 
states ensues.  If the target state ignores the inducement, then future influence efforts are 
modified accordingly, typically resulting in the cessation of positive incentives.65  
Unconditional engagement may also include positive incentives offered to the target 
state’s civil society, as often undertaken by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).  As 
previously mentioned, the intent in using unconditional engagement is to facilitate future 
cooperation and state-to-state engagement.  For example, efforts by NGOs such as the 
National Endowment for Democracy that facilitate growth of democratic institutions in a 
target state are beneficial to long-term U.S. influence efforts.66  Conditional engagement 
requires reciprocal and usually prescribed responses from the target state.  A recent 
example of conditional engagement was the Agreed Framework negotiated between the 
United States, North Korea, and several other states in 1994 in which Pyongyang agreed 
 
62 Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 2. 
63 Ibid., 160. 
64 Ibid., 4. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 5. 
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to cease production of nuclear materials in exchange for crude oil and other energy 
securities.67
Haass and O’Sullivan list four primary types of engagement:  economic, political, 
military and social/cultural.  Further they comprehensively list examples of these four 
types of engagement (italics added): 
Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export 
credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, 
and economic aid…the removal of penalties, whether they be trade 
embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic 
relations between the United States and the target country.  In addition, 
facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that 
govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global 
market…political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic 
recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the 
scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these 
benefits.  Military engagement could involve the extension of international 
Military Education Training (IMET)…cultural or civil society 
engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts.  Funding 
nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, 
establishing postal and telephone links…and promoting the exchange of 
students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people….68
 
1. Crafting an Engagement Strategy  
Haass and O’Sullivan argue that U.S. relations to various target states within the 
current, post-Cold War international system are ripe for the advantageous use of 
engagement.  Given the lack of Soviet sponsorship, many former satellite states, now 
“rogue states,” are experiencing the economic and security vulnerability that makes them 
potential candidates for a U.S. engagement policy.69  Furthermore, positive incentives 
may be in U.S. interests in more ways than just beneficial behavioral change.  Economic 
incentives have the potential to open new markets to U.S. investment, consumption of 
U.S. goods, and general U.S. economic growth.70  Haass and O’Sullivan further argue the 
advantage of using engagement in that the use of positive incentives can build the 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 5-6. 
69 Ibid., 3. 
70 Ibid. 
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legitimacy of later coercive efforts.  Where these positive engagement efforts are 
attempted and fail, the influencing state can build a case for the legitimacy of follow-on 
coercive strategies. This may be particularly so in efforts to build support for allied 
involvement in the influencing state’s efforts.  For example, Haass and O’Sullivan argue 
that U.S. efforts to build a coalition against Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War 
(1991) benefited from the perception that the U.S. had been conciliatory and cooperative 
with Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait. 71
Despite the timeliness and advantages of engagement as a viable influence 
strategy, there are several disadvantages to its use.  First, the concept of engagement is 
often likened to appeasement in the minds of policy makers and their supporting 
constituents.  Appeasement as a concept carries with it a sort of social-historical shame 
and therefore it may be difficult to justify its use to a domestic political audience.  
Second, in many cases, and as can clearly been seen with recent U.S. rhetoric about 
current rogue states, governments vilify target states to help garner domestic political 
support for policies against them.  As such, it may be difficult, after having vilified the 
target state, to turn the policy tide and offer the same state positive inducements.  Haass 
and O’Sullivan refer to this as the “unattractiveness of the target state”—again often the 
product of both the actions of the rogue state themselves and the accompanying anti-
target state rhetoric by the influencing state.72   
A third disadvantage of using engagement is that third party states who offer 
incentives similar to those offered by the influencing state may actually diminish the 
significance of the influencing state’s efforts.  If the influencing state is trying to uniquely 
provide economic incentives to effect a behavior change in the target state and another 
third party state offers the target state the same or similar inducements, the result may 
weaken the influencing state’s bargaining power and result in a lack of behavior change 
by the target.73  A fourth potential disadvantage of using positive incentives, particularly 
economic incentives, is that without regulation, economic benefits may provide the 
means by which the target state can engage in disagreeable behavior, such as the 
 
71 Ibid., 162. 
72 Ibid., 164, 178. 
73 Ibid., 4. 
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purchase of weapons or other military technologies.  As a result, Haass and O’Sullivan 
recommend that any economic incentive package be structured to avoid this outcome.  
Phasing incentives to the target state over a period of time can ensure compliance and 
appropriate behavioral changes.74  Finally, much of the influence literature discusses the 
importance of the credibility and bargaining position of the influencing state to the 
successful accomplishment of its objectives.  If the target state or other states perceive the 
influencing state as “weak on proliferation issues” or “unwilling to use force” because of 
the use of positive incentives, there can be problems with maintaining credibility and a 
strong bargaining position. 
In their concluding chapter, Haass and O’Sullivan provide conditions under which 
engagement tends to work best.  First, engagement tends to work best in target states 
where the decision making is highly centralized.  Small, centralized decision making 
structures, as are often found in governing bodies of rogue type states like North Korea, 
Syria, and Libya, tend to have the ability to make the behavioral changes if the decision-
maker(s) becomes willing to do so.  Unlike more decentralized decision-making 
structures that have multiple checks on the power of the primary decision-makers, highly 
centralized governments have less political constraints on policy making.75  Within these 
centralized decision-making structures, positive political incentives tend to be most 
effective, such as membership in international associations, diplomatic recognition 
between influential states and the target state, high-level exchanges between the states.  
These incentives tend to boost the political power of the centralized decision-making 
body/group and therefore tend to be received positively by the target state.76 A corollary 
disadvantage, however, is that these same centralized decision-makers can also change 
their minds and reject engagement efforts with little to no checks on their decision 
making.77  Two final recommendations for successful engagement strategy crafting are 
 
74 Ibid., 165. 
75 Ibid., 162. 
76 Ibid., 162-163. 
77 Ibid., 164. 
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that policy makers elicit the support of influential sub-groups within the domestic 
political structure and that engagement goals be modest and incremental.78
Finally, Haass and O’Sullivan provide guidelines for maximizing the 
effectiveness of any engagement strategy.  First, any engagement strategy should be 
clearly articulated in a “road-map” format which outlines tangible requirements and 
corresponding rewards for and by the target and influencing states.  This kind of clear-cut 
incrementalization helps to ensure transparency and verification of each step in the 
process of behavior change.  Further, these steps help to build confidence between the 
countries and may be particularly apt in an influence exchange between states that have a 
history of poor communications and misunderstanding.79  Second, where appropriate, 
incentives should engage multiple sectors of the target state’s structure, including the 
civil and military sector.  The reasoning here is that if other groups within the society 
benefit from the influencing state’s engagement policy they may be influential in the 
ultimate success of that policy.  As previously discussed, this may translate into 
unconditional incentives for the civil and military sector in conjunction with conditional 
incentives for the target state government and/or the provision of “shared” or public 
goods, such as decreased tariffs or Most Favored Nation status, that benefit the entire 
state. 80  Haass and O’Sullivan argue that cultural incentives may be most appropriate 
when targeting the non-governmental sectors of the target state.  In this case, cultural 
incentives tend not to strengthen the target state’s regime.81  
Haass and O’Sullivan and others in the influence literature argue for the 
combination of carrots and sticks to effect successful behavior change.  In this case, they 
argue for including credible punishments or negative inducements, including 
disengagement, with the positive incentives.  These punishments may help push the target 
state into accepting the engagement strategy and making the desired behavioral change, 
 
78 Ibid., 165-167. 
79 Ibid., 169-170. 
80 Ibid., 172.  James Davis distinguishes between private rewards and public or “shared” rewards.  Private rewards are typically 
more limited than public rewards and typically available to a select group, such as the target state decision-making structure involved 
in the influence exchange.  Davis describes private rewards as the “transfer of value between or among actors” that may or may not be 
tangible. Examples include “cash payments, territorial cessations, the granting or transferal of resource rights, as well as transfers of 
arms and food.” Public or shared rewards tend to be less quantifiable and tend to benefit both parties, 14-16. 
81 Haass and O’Sullivan, 172. 
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“…clarity of goals as well as clarity of consequences almost always contribute to a more 
effective engagement strategy.”82   Alexander George notes that in combining carrots and 
sticks timing is important.  Writing on the use of positive incentives with coercive 
diplomacy, he argues that incentives should follow coercive threats or actions, thereby 
solidifying the influencing state’s resolve prior to the offer of engagement.83     
Finally, and perhaps most critically, successful influence strategy of any kind 
requires close coordination with allies.  Allied support and lack of support can enhance or 
diminish the strength of any influence strategy.  As will be demonstrated in this 
proceeding case study, the imposition of UN sanctions on Libya for their lack of 
cooperation with the Pan Am 103 bombings enhanced U.S. economic, political, and 
cultural sanctions by allowing for the virtual isolation of Libya.  Had UN sanctions not 
been in place, an argument can be made that European trade with Libya would have 
continued and significantly diminished both the impact of U.S. sanctions and U.S. 
bargaining power in the influence exchange.  In a similar example, Haass and O’Sullivan 
argue that the lack of coordination between the U.S. and its allies prior to the 
implementation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996 caused friction between 
the countries.84
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Case Study Methodology 
A critical examination of situations in which deterrence, compellence, or 
engagement was applied against a nation-state to achieve a certain behavioral outcome 
should provide the analyst insight helpful in crafting successful influence strategies 
against current and future rogue states.  With that policy prescriptive end-goal in mind, 
this thesis seeks to examine the application of U.S. influence strategy to Libya between 
1986-2004 to determine what kind of strategies (deterrence, compellence, engagement, or 
a combination thereof) were applied, evaluate their success or failure, and finally 
consider other factors that may have contributed to its success or failure.  The larger case 
 
82 Ibid., 174-175. 
83 Alexander George, “Introduction,” in Art, 2003, x. 
84 The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) imposed significant fines on companies or individuals doing business with or investing 
a proscribed amount of money (US$20-40 million) in Iran or Libya. More information on ILSA available from 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23591.pdf; accessed 25 July 2004.  Haass and O’Sullivan, 176.   
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study of U.S. policy towards Libya will be divided into sub-analyses of four different 
U.S. presidential administrations, Reagan through George W. Bush.  These analyses will 
consider U.S. influence strategy concerning terrorism and/or WMD.  Though both of 
these threats were a concern to the U.S. government, they were treated as separate issues.  
For example, after the Libyan government renounced terrorism, the George W. Bush 
Administration continued to apply a compellence policy, citing concerns over Libya’s 
pursuit of WMD.      
Before beginning the case study it is important to understand clearly how the 
various influence strategies will be evaluated in terms of (1) the structure of their 
communication and implementation and (2) their success or failure in producing the 
desired behavior change.  Each of the three major influence strategies and the way in 
which they will be analyzed in the U.S.-Libya case study will be outlined below. 
For the purposes of this thesis, a deterrence encounter will be considered to take 
place when it is demonstrated that (1) the target state had, during the specific historical 
period in question, an intention to take a particular course of action; and (2) the 
influencing state identified that action as unacceptable, signaled a resolve to punish that 
behavior, demonstrated its resolve, and maintained a credible capability to enact the 
punishment.  For the U.S.-Libya case study to follow, a deterrence influence exchange 
will be considered to have taken place when it is demonstrated that (1) Libya intended to 
continue its support of terrorism or its production of WMD (indicators of this intention 
may include but not be limited to indications of planning for future terrorist operations, 
financial or other support for terrorist organizations, construction of WMD-related 
facilities, purchase of WMD-related materials or technologies, and/or contracting of 
WMD-related expertise from other countries); and (2) the United States identified Libyan 
support to terrorism or production of WMD as unacceptable, signaled resolve to punish 
this behavior, demonstrated the resolve, and maintained a credible capability to back up 
its threats. 
Deterrence success in the U.S.-Libya case will be defined as the decision by the 
target state to cease future support for terrorism or production of WMD.   Indicators of 
successful deterrence may be evident in the target state articulating a change in terrorism 
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and WMD policy, decreased support for terrorist organizations, becoming a signatory or 
ratifying an international WMD-related agreement, and/or disavowing future WMD-
related behavior.  Deterrence failure will be defined as the target state continuing support 
for both terrorism and the production of WMD.  Indicators of failed deterrence include 
public declarations, engagement in terrorist acts after the application of deterrence, 
continued support for terrorist organizations, production of WMD or other WMD-related 
activities, or the withdrawal from international WMD-related agreements. 
For the purposes of this thesis, a compellence encounter will be considered to take 
place when the influencing state communicates through words and actions to the target 
state a demand that the target state take a particular action.  As a review, this action may 
include (1) taking a course of action not currently being taken, (2) cessation of an action 
already underway, or (3) the reversal of a course of action.  In the case study, a 
compellence exchange will have taken place if the United States communicated through 
words and actions a demand that Libya cease support for terrorism or production of 
WMD.  The encounter will be considered coercive diplomacy if the influencing state 
threatens or uses limited force in communicating the demand.  The compellence 
exchange will be considered successful if Libya acquiesces to the United States’ demand 
and a failure if Libya does not take the prescribed action.  Coercive diplomacy will be 
considered a failure if the United States resorts to the use of more than limited force to 
get Libya to acquiesce.  The compellence exchange will be evaluated against the seven 
conditions set forth by Robert Art: 
• Influencing state’s clarity in defining the objective being sought.  
• Influencing state’s determination to act. 
• Asymmetry of motivation, or greater motivation to prevail by the 
influencing state when compared to the target state’s motivation to resist. 
• Influencing state’s communicated sense of urgency for compliance by the 
target state. 
• Adequate domestic and international support for influencing state. 
• Target state’s fear of unacceptable escalation. 
• Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis. 
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Finally, the United States will have applied a strategy of engagement if it offers 
positive incentives either alone or in conjunction with negative incentives, or threats, to 
effect Libyan behavior change.  Engagement efforts will be assessed on two levels: (1) 
categorical type (conditional or unconditional; economic, political, military, cultural or a 
combination thereof) and (2) effectiveness based on the format of the incentives (road-
map, incrementalized), sectors of country effected (civil, military, governmental), 
coupling with threats or negative inducements, and coordination with Allies. 
Other factors to be considered in the case study include the context of the 
immediate situation and the historical relationship between the United States and Libya.85 
Analysis of the reasons for success and failure in these cases will lead to concluding 
recommendations for strategy approaches to influencing rogue state behavior in the 
future.   
2. Assumptions  
A few key assumptions will guide this analysis.  They are: 
1. Evidence of weapons of mass destruction programs in a state is an indication 
of that state’s intent to create WMD.  Rogue state plans for the use of WMD 
materials (weaponization for its own use or proliferation to other states or 
non-state actors) will not be explored in this thesis. 
2. Both target and influencing states are treated as unitary actors in which 
decisions are made by either a single decision-maker or a small, cohesive 
collective.  The exception to this is situations in which incentives are targeted 
at a specific sector like the military. 
3. The decision-maker in both target state and influencing state is a rational 
actor.  Huth and Russett define rational as the ability to order one’s 
preferences, choose along those preferences, and perceive likely outcomes to 
the choices.86   
4. Public communications parallel those conducted between regimes through 
classified, diplomatic, and other channels.  It is further assumed that speeches 
 
85 To fully understand a situation in which deterrence is applied, Lebow and Stein encourage examination of both the immediate 
situation and the historical relationship between the actors involved, 355-356. 
86 Huth and Russett, 499. 
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made by policymakers and decision makers from the influencing and target 
states are a true reflection of their state’s posture. 
 
3. Sources 
Both primary and secondary sources will be used for this thesis.  Primary sources 
will consist of both target state and influencing state documents, including executive-
level memorandums, statements, and/or speeches, press releases, U.S. Department of 
State and Department of Defense bulletins, issue papers, etc., U.S. Congressional 
testimony and laws, and international agreements and treaties.  Secondary sources will 
include analyses of deterrence theory and U.S. deterrence efforts in Libya.  Where 
possible, primary and secondary sources will be sought which provide target state insight 
and perspective.  It is important to also note that the author is aware and acknowledges 
that all information concerning communication between the nation-states and 
deliberations of their decision makers in this case study is not available for analysis.  
Many of these communications and documents are classified or not available to the 
public.  As noted above, an assumption has been made that public communications 
parallel those conducted between regimes through classified, diplomatic, and other 
channels.  It is further assumed that speeches made by policymakers and decision makers 






                                                
III. RONALD REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
On April 5, 1999, after 13 years of U.S. sanctions and 7 years of UN sanctions, 
the Libyan government turned over to British authorities two suspects in the terrorist 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103.  Four years later, on December 19, 2003, Libyan Foreign 
Minister Abdel Rahman Shalqam announced his government’s decision to discontinue its 
production of weapons of mass destruction.87  What happened in those many years to 
cause a change in Libyan policy with respect to terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction?  Can the analyst point to any factors, events, or actions within the 18 total 
years of US sanctions and the 11 total years of UN sanctions and say with certainty that 
they contributed to Libyan behavioral change?  To answer these questions the following 
analyses (chapters III-VI) will examine US influence policy towards Libya through four 
successive U.S. presidential administrations: Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and 
George W. Bush.  U.S. policy will be examined in light of UN sanctions and other 
relevant events to determine what, if any, influence strategy was applied and how it 
contributed to Libyan behavior change.  It will be argued that the U.S. influence strategy 
was unsuccessful in the short-term and successful in the long-term in facilitating Libyan 
behavior change. 
A. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are 
violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.  We hear 
it said that we live in an era of limit to our powers.  Well, let it also be 
understood, there are limits to our patience.88
 
To set a context for an analysis of the Reagan Administration’s dealings with 
Libya, it is important to briefly examine U.S. relations with the Qadhafi regime up to 
 
87 Specifically, the Libyan government pledged to, (a) eliminate all elements of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, (b) 
Declare all nuclear activities to the IAEA, (c) eliminate ballistic missiles beyond 300 km range, with a payload of 500kg, (d) accept 
international inspections to ensure Libya’s complete adherence to the Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty, and sign the Additional 
Protocol, (e) eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions, and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and (f) allow 
immediate inspections and monitoring to verify all of these actions. White House, “Fact Sheet: The President’s National Security 
Strategy to Combat WMD, Libya’s Announcement,” 19 December 2003; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gove/news/reselases/2003/12/print/20031219-8.html; accessed 12 July 2004. 
88 President Ronald Reagan, Statement, 27 Jan 1981, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current 
Documents, 1981.  (Washington, D.C., 1982), 393.  Remarks at ceremony celebrating the release of the Iranian-held U.S. hostages. 
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1980.  Colonel Muammar Qadhafi led the Free Officer’s Movement in a coup against the 
Libyan monarchy in 1969 and established a new government called the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC).  The RCC was comprised of 12-members, of which Qadhafi 
was and still is the leader. The RCC was against all forms of colonialism and 
imperialism; anti-Western, anti-Soviet, officially non-aligned, they were firmly dedicated 
to both Arab unity and the support of Palestine.  Beginning in 1969, U.S. foreign policy 
towards the new, revolutionary Libyan government89 was conciliatory.  The 
Revolutionary Command Council declared itself anti-Soviet, anti-communist, and 
nonaligned, allaying Washington’s concerns about the potential spread of communism in 
the Middle East.   
Prior to 1973 most of Washington’s overtures toward Libya were of a non-hostile 
nature.  Several events in 1973 led the U.S. government to shift its policy from 
conciliatory to low-key, low-priority opposition of the Libyan government.90  First, the 
U.S. discovered Libyan involvement in the PLO embassy seizure in Sudan wherein two 
U.S. diplomats were killed.  Subsequently, two Libyan Mirage jets fired on U.S. RC-130 
reconnaissance aircraft operating near Libya in international waters—a scenario that 
would be repeated multiple times in the eighties.  Later in October of 1973, Qadhafi 
declared all of the Gulf of Sidra (international waters south of 32 degrees, 30 minutes 
north latitude) as part of Libyan territorial waters.  Qadhafi then ordered an assassination 
plot against Henry Kissinger for his role in the Middle East peace process and publicly 
called for a terrorist campaign against U.S. interests.  The U.S. applied an arms embargo 
against Libya, blocking the delivery of eight C-130 aircraft that the government assessed 
would increase Libya’s military capabilities.91  Friction between the two countries 
continued during the Ford Administration, resulting in the deaths of more U.S. citizens 
abroad. 
The Carter Administration policy towards Libya was engagement-oriented in the 
hope of improving relations.  Carter even wrote two letters to Qadhafi warning him to 
 
89 See the Appendix for a brief review of Libyan history.   
90 Brian L. Davis, Qadhafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger, 1990), 34. 
91 Ibid., 35. 
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quit his ambitions to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Hermann Eilts.92  
Though Carter was more conciliatory, Qadhafi was not.  His anti-American sentiment 
and rhetoric increased, likely due in part to U.S. efforts to facilitate the Middle East peace 
process and his own anti-imperialist leanings.  Finally, in 1979, the U.S. embassy in 
Libya was attacked and burned, with apparent participation of Libyan government 
officials.93  That same year the U.S. government officially designated Libya as a state 
sponsor of terrorism. 
B. CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF INFLUENCE STRATEGY-RELATED 
EVENTS 
1. U.S.-Libyan Interactions, 1981-1985      
The period 1981-1985 saw a spate of dramatic and damaging terrorist attacks 
against U.S. targets and interests throughout the world.  The Reagan Administration in its 
rhetoric demonstrated an increasing concern over state sponsorship of terrorism, with the 
most likely suspects being Syria, Iran, Libya, and North Korea.  Concurrently, the 
Reagan Administration expressed a growing concern specifically with Libya’s terrorism-
based foreign policy.  This period saw several “tit-for-tat” exchanges of military force 
between the U.S. and Libya.  These exchanges were often the result of U.S. military 
deployments into areas considered territorial waters by Libya and international waters by 
the United States.  As a result of these negative interactions between the two militaries 
and concern over Libyan foreign policy, the Reagan Administration took a series of 
diplomatic steps signaling their disapproval with the actions of the Qadhafi regime.  
These steps included closing the Libyan People’s Bureau in Washington and placing 
restrictions on the movement of Libyan diplomats assigned to the United Nations in New 
York.  The Reagan Administration also took economic steps to signal their disapproval, 
such as the denial of export licenses for sale of technology that had military applications 
and any other exports with potential to be used against the United States (in conventional 
or nonconventional use of force).  Finally, with Executive Order 12538 in November of 
1985, the Reagan Administration placed an embargo on Libyan oil imports to the U.S. 
 
92 Ibid., 36. 
93 Ibid., 37. 
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2. U.S. Influence Strategy 1986-1989: “…our limits have been 
reached”94 
U.S. policy concerning terrorism reached a turning point in early 1986 after a 
series of high profile terrorist attacks directed against U.S. persons and interests.  These 
attacks happened at different places throughout the world and were likely perpetrated by 
various terrorist groups.  After the shooting of six Americans in El Salvador in June of 
1985, President Reagan established a terrorism working group headed by Vice President 
George H.W. Bush.  The intention of the group was to work with U.S. allies to explore 
policy options against terrorism.  An intense spate of terrorist attacks followed in late 
1985, most notably the October hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the November hijacking 
of an EgyptAir flight and bombing of a U.S. military post exchange in Frankfurt, 
Germany, and the December Abu Nidal attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports. 
On January 7, 1986 President Reagan issued Executive Orders 12543 and 12544.  
These Executive Orders declared a national state of emergency with Libya and imposed 
broad economic sanctions against Tripoli, including the freezing of Libyan assets in U.S. 
territories.  Further, these Executive orders banned travel to Libya by U.S. citizens and 
resident aliens.  In his opening statement at the press conference explaining these actions, 
Reagan laid out Libya’s connection to the most recent terrorist attacks, the Rome and 
Vienna airport bombings: 
But these murderers could not carry out their crimes without the sanctuary 
and support provided by regimes such as Colonel Qadhafi’s in Libya.  
Qadhafi’s longstanding involvement in terrorism is well documented, and 
there’s irrefutable evidence of his role in these attacks.  The Rome and 
Vienna murders are only the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts 
committed with Qadhafi’s backing.  Qadhafi and other Libyan officials 
have publicly admitted that the Libyan Government has abetted and 
supported the notorious Abu Nidal terrorist group, which was directly 
responsible for the Rome and Vienna attacks….By providing material 
support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged 
in armed aggression against the United States under established principles 
of international law, just as if he had used its own armed forces.95
 
94 President Reagan, Statement after the shooting of six Americans in El Salvador, 20 June 1985, in U.S. Department of State, 
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1985.  (Washington, D.C., 1986), 283. 
95 President Reagan, Statement at 7 Jan 1986 Press Conference, in U.S. Department of State.  American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, 1986. (Washington, D.C., 1987), 446.   
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In this same press conference, Reagan called on other nations to support isolation 
of Qadhafi.  It is clear from the outset of this policy change that the Reagan 
Administration both understood the importance of and actively sought international 
support in diplomatic and economic actions against Libya.  In a statement the next day, 
Reagan commented on his Administration’s efforts to seek international support and the 
importance thereof: “Cooperation of our allies and friends is critical if we’re to exact a 
high cost to Qadhafi…In our consultations, the United States will make it clear our 
position is that all nations must act in concert if we are to halt terrorism.”96  Further, 
Reagan threatened other measures, implying the use of force, if these diplomatic and 
economic measures did not succeed in facilitating Libyan change regarding terrorism.  “If 
these steps do not end Qadhafi’s terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be 
taken.”97  He underscored this implied threat that same day in a prepared statement read 
by the Deputy Press Secretary:    
The United States will continue to reserve the right to act in an appropriate 
manner in our own self defense.  All available measures will remain under 
consideration to bring terrorists to justice.  We want to convince Qadhafi 
that terrorism will not be cost-free, nor will it be without consequence.  
Should Qadhafi continue his involvement in international terrorism, we’re 
fully prepared to take additional measures. 98  
 
A statement from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs later 
that month reiterated the threat: 
…the steps we have taken to date are not the most severe actions that 
could be levied against Qadhafi….If Libyan aid to terrorists continues, 
however, the U.S. has the option of imposing a range of more severe 
actions.  The steps that we have taken may not be our final response, but 
we sincerely hope additional efforts will not prove necessary.99
  
 
96President Reagan, Statement read by Deputy Press Secretary Speakes, 8 Jan 1986, in U.S. Department of State.  American 
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986. (Washington, D.C., 1987), 447-448 
97President Reagan, Statement, 7 Jan 1986, in U.S. Department of State.  American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986. 
(Washington, D.C., 1987), 447. 
98 Reagan Statement read by Speakes, Ibid., 448. 
99Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Prepared Statement, 28 January 1986, in U.S. Department of State.  
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986. (Washington, D.C., 1987), 448-449. 
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This implied threat of force was finally actualized in April of 1986 following the 
explosion of TWA 840 and the bombing of the Berlin La Belle discothèque—both of 
which were linked to Libyan terrorist operatives.  The U.S. responded with force in the 
Operation El Dorado Canyon air strikes against terrorist and military related targets in 
Benghazi and Tripoli.  This was a classic case of coercive diplomacy in the U.S. use of 
limited force to punish a target state (Libya) for actions taken.  Further the selection of 
terrorist-related targets was meant to send a message urging Libya to cease support for 
terrorism.100  In his statement after the air strikes, Reagan made it clear that the use of 
force against Libya could happen again in the future in response to terrorist attacks—a 
clear deterrence statement: 
Several weeks ago in New Orleans I warned Colonel Qadhafi we would 
hold his regime accountable for any new terrorist attacks launched against 
American citizens.  More recently I made it clear we would respond as 
soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible for such 
attacks….Today we have done what we had to do.  If necessary, we shall 
do it again.101
 
Furthermore, in an interview the day of the air strikes, Secretary of State Shultz 
made it clear that with this act of coercive diplomacy the Reagan Administration was 
sending a warning message to all terrorists contemplating future attacks against the 
United States: “…it has been shown that he [Qadhafi] and the people around him will pay 
a price for their terrorist activities, and that we hope will give him some pause and give 
others some pause as they undertake these terrorist actions around the world…”102
The months following the Operation El Dorado Canyon air strikes saw a lull in 
terrorist-related activity and exchanges between U.S. and Libya.  There are indications 
the Reagan Administration believed this lull was a result of the April air strikes, though 
 
100 The five targets selected for Operation El Dorado Canyon included:  Aziziya Barracks in Tripoli, Jamahiriyah Guard 
Barracks in Benghazi, Murrat Side Bilal base, military facilities at the primary airfield in Tripoli, and the Benina Military Airfield 
southeast of Benghazi.  This latter target was a MiG fighter base and though not directly related to terrorism, was added to decrease 
the Libyan MiG threat to U.S. fighters during the mission.  Information available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/el_dorado_canyon.htm; accessed 24 August 2004. 
101 President Reagan, “Statement on Operation El Dorado Canyon air strikes against Libyan targets,” 15 April 1986, in U.S. 
Department of State.  American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986. (Washington, D.C., 1987), 450. 
102 Secretary of State Shultz, Interview with Bryant Gumble, 15 Apr 1986, in U.S. Department of State.  American Foreign 
Policy: Current Documents, 1986. (Washington, D.C., 1987), 452. 
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they were not convinced Qadhafi had given up terrorism entirely nor changed his foreign 
policy.103  In a speech on terrorism at George Washington University two and a half 
years after the strikes, Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, L. Paul Bremer, 
made this assessment of Libyan behavior post-Operation El Dorado Canyon:  
Libya’s continued—even growing—involvement in terrorism is our 
second concern.  After 2 years of relative quiet, Qadhafi is becoming more 
active…he is increasingly using surrogates to implement his terrorist 
attacks.  We have indications that Libya is augmenting its assistance to 
and enhancing its relationship with such terrorist groups as the Abu Nidal 
Organization, the Japanese Red Army, and the Provisional IRA.104
 
In historical retrospect, it is clear that though there was a temporary lull in 
activity, Tripoli sponsored planning was likely underway for the Pan Am 103 bombing 
which would take place on December 21, 1988—a clear signal that Libya was not 
finished with terrorist activities.  Furthermore, in the midst of this lull in terrorist activity, 
the Reagan Administration discovered Libya was constructing a large chemical weapons 
complex in Rabta.  This presented another foreign policy challenge and issue of concern 
for the United States, as the Administration soon articulated their concern that any Libyan 
WMD could be used in a terrorist strike against U.S. persons. 
3.  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 Qadhafi’s response to U.S. accusations that he was creating a large chemical 
weapons complex in Rabta105 was that the facility would be used to make medicines—
medicines he falsely claimed Libya was denied under U.S. sanctions.  The Reagan 
Administration expressed concern about possible linkage between Libya’s new chemical 
 
103 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Murphy, Statement, 15 September 1987, in U.S. 
Department of State.  American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1987. (Washington, D.C., 1988), 415. 
104 Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism Bremer, Speech before George Washington University conference on 
terrorism, 22 Nov 1988, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1988. (Washington, D.C., 1989), 
229. 
105 In September and October of 1988, the Reagan Administration charged that Tripoli was nearing full-scale chemical weapons 
production at Rabta— one of the largest known chemical weapons facilities in the world. 
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weapons capability and its terrorist activity, 106 and as such, the influence strategy applied 
to terrorism—compellence and deterrence through diplomatic and economic sanctions—
was likewise applied to the WMD issue.  At a press conference, Secretary of State Shultz 
explained, 
[H]aving reviewed our evidence, there is no question whatever that 
Qadhafi is trying to equip himself with a major chemical weapons 
production facility. And he hasn’t quite got there yet. He needs aid from 
the outside in order to get there.  We’re trying to do everything we can to 
throw every conceivable monkey wrench we can find into his 
machinery….And I don’t want Qadhafi to have it or to have the ability to 
give it to some terrorists.  That’s why we are struggling so hard at this 
issue.107
 
Limited force was also threatened very early in the public discourse over the 
Rabta complex.  In a news conference on December 21, 1988, President Reagan implied 
that his Administration and U.S. allies were in consultation over the use of force against 
Libya once again, this time directed at Libyan chemical weapons production: 
Q.  Now, at one time, we bombed Libya as a sort of punishment for its 
involvement in terrorism.  Are we going to bomb his poison gas factory? 
And if not, why not? 
The President.  Well, let me say that’s a decision that has not been made 
yet.  We’re in communication with our allies and with NATO forces and 
all, and we’re watching very closely that situation.  But even if I had made 
a decision, I couldn’t--   




106 Though there is current and unresolved debate in policy, academic, and media circles concerning the linkage of terrorism 
with WMD as it pertains to rogue states, a reasonable case can be made that the Reagan Administration had sufficient cause for 
concern over this potential linkage, especially given Qadhafi’s view of terrorism as a tool in his ideological struggle against 
imperialism, his previous use of terrorism in multiple forms against U.S. persons, and his ties to terrorist organizations such as Abu 
Nidal.   
107 Secretary of State Shultz, Press Conference in Vienna, 17 Jan 1989, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, 1989. (Washington, D.C., 1990), 455. 
108 Interview with President Reagan, 21 Dec 1988, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 
1988. (Washington, D.C., 1989), 433. 
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There are indications this threat was received and believed.  The Arab League 
warned the U.S. shortly after this press conference that there would be repercussions in 
U.S.-Arab relations should the U.S. attack Libya again.109  
Qadhafi also indicated he had received the message of implied threat against his 
“medical” factory.  In a speech broadcast on Libyan radio January 9, 1989, Qadhafi 
commented on the threat of U.S. military strikes on the Rabta plant,  
We built a factory for medicine…[t]hey said this constitutes danger. 
America with all its greatness said, 'I want to destroy this factory.' Why? 
Because it is a factory that constitutes a danger.  Even the factories that 
make atom bombs are a cause of danger, and so we should destroy 
them…and this is what should happen. If they destroy this factory, we 
should get ready to destroy anything American that we can reach.110
 
In the final analysis, it would appear that the Reagan Administration added 
weapons of mass destruction as a concern to their existing influence strategy against 
Libya.  As such, the same compellence and deterrence strategy, through the use of 
diplomatic and economic sanctions, was applied to Libya for WMD reasons, in addition 
to terrorism and subversion.  This is reflected concisely in the rationale given for 
modifications made to Executive Order 12543 allowing U.S. oil companies to resume 
operations or sell their business holdings in Libya—enacted on Reagan’s last day in 
office, January 19, 1989.  In a statement on the modifications, Press Secretary Fitzwater 
commented, “This decision does not represent a change in the attitude of the U.S. 
government toward Libya.  We remain deeply concerned about Qadhafi’s continued 
support for terrorism and subversion as well as Libyan efforts to develop a chemical 
weapons capability.”111
C. SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE POLICY AND LIBYAN RESPONSE 
U.S influence strategy against Libya can be summarized as follows:  (1) a 
compellence policy was applied beginning in 1986 to change existing Libyan behavior 
 
109 Ronald Bruce St John, Historical Dictionary of Libya, 3rd edition (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1998), xxxv. 
110 “Threat by Qaddafi,” AP Wire, 9 Jan 1989 [information online]; available from Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> 
(accessed 24 August 2004). 
111 Statement by President Reagan’s Press Secretary, Fitzwater, 19 Jan 1989, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign 
Policy: Current Documents, 1989. (Washington, D.C., 1990), 456. 
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concerning initially terrorism and later also WMD, (2) coercive diplomacy was used in 
1986 in the form of limited air strikes against terrorism related targets, and (3) deterrence 
was used beginning in 1986 to increase the costs of future/continued Libyan terrorism 
activities.  The primary tools of this influence policy were diplomatic and economic 
sanctions applied through Executive Orders 12538, 12543, and 12544, and the air strikes 
of Operation El Dorado Canyon.  Libyan response to this policy was to continue terrorist 
activities, including their support to a variety of terrorist groups including Abu Nidal, the 
Provisional IRA, and the Japanese Red Army.  Further, approximately two and a half 
years after Operation El Dorado Canyon, Libyan agents conducted yet another damaging 
terrorist attack against U.S. and allied persons—the bombing of Pan Am 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988.   Libyan agents were also linked to another 
airliner bombing six months later, UTA 772, which exploded over Niger. 
It can reasonably be assessed, then, that the U.S. efforts to curb Libyan terrorist 
activities failed.  An examination of the compellence and deterrence policies my help 
illuminate reasons for this failure.   
1. Compellence Analysis 
Robert Art provides seven factors that are critical to the success of any 
compellence policy.  These seven are reviewed here with respect to the U.S. influence 
strategy against Libya during the Reagan Administration to determine possible reasons 
for the failure of that policy to facilitate Libyan behavior change. Influencing state’s 
clarity in defining the objective being sought.  The United States met this criterion.  The 
Reagan Administration made an explicit linkage of Libyan support to terrorism to 
Executive Order 12538 and declared Libyan “policies and actions” as an “unusual and 
extraordinary” threat to U.S. national security in the text of Executive Orders 12543 and 
12544.  Further, in reviewing Administration speeches and comments on terrorism 
throughout the eighties it is clear rhetorically that the U.S. was determined to stop attacks 
against its interests and allies. 
Influencing state’s determination to act.  The U.S. also met this requirement.  The 
Reagan Administration demonstrated their determination to act in the escalation of 
punitive actions taken against Libya from 1981-1989.  Reagan began his influence 
strategy against Libya with rhetorical statements decrying Libyan activities, diplomatic 
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actions like closing the Libyan People’s Bureau in Washington, and exchanging 
conventional force in the Gulf of Sidra; he ended his Administration with the use of 
limited force against terrorism related targets in Libya, the threat of force against the 
Rabta chemical weapons complex, and complete economic sanctions.  Though these 
actions do indicate a determination to act, they do not reflect whether Qadhafi himself 
interpreted them as determination.     
Influencing state’s greater motivation to prevail versus target state’s motivation 
to resist.  Arguably, this requirement was not met.  To understand Qadhafi’s motivation 
to resist and in particular his continued willingness to use terrorism as a tool of Libyan 
foreign policy, it is important to understand the ideology of his revolution.  At the heart 
of his revolution was a fervent belief in secular Arab nationalism. Noted Libyan scholar 
Ronald Bruce St John writes that jihad was the “action element of that Arab 
nationalism.”112  Jihad was a tool for achieving social justice both in Libya and 
throughout the world.  As such, Qadhafi supported liberation movements which he 
believed were engaged in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, from the Irish 
Republican Army to radical Palestinian groups.  What he viewed as liberation violence, 
the United States and other Western European nations viewed as terrorism—a distinction 
he attempted to make but which likely fell on deaf ears. 
His support for liberation movements also brought Qaddafi into prolonged 
contact with groups and activities that the United States and its Western 
allies associated with terrorism.  Consequently, he spent considerable 
effort in the 1980s and 1990s trying to differentiate between revolutionary 
violence, which he continued to support, and terrorism, which he 
purportedly opposed.113
 
Though it is difficult to measure motivation to prevail, it is clear from Qadhafi’s 
actions during the eighties that his motivation to resist was greater than U.S. efforts to 
prevail against him.  In fact, Reagan’s actions may have worked his influence efforts, as 
there are indications that the 1986 air strikes demoralized Qadhafi’s opposition and 
 




                                                
rallied the more radical, pro-revolutionary elements in Libyan society.114  In any case, the 
analyst can rightly conclude that Qadhafi was still very ideologically motivated at this 
time and likely saw the exchange of rhetoric and force between Libya and the U.S. during 
the eighties as a righteous struggle between his revolutionary ideals and western 
imperialism.  
Influencing state’s communicated sense of urgency for compliance.  The Reagan 
Administration did communicate a sense of urgency in seeking Libyan compliance with 
U.S. demands.  The eighties uniquely were a decade of intense terrorist attacks against 
U.S. persons and interests throughout the world.  There were at least 22 terrorist incidents 
directed at U.S. persons between 1980 and 1989, many of which were major attacks such 
as the bombing of the U.S. embassy (63 killed) and Marine Barracks (242 killed) in 
Beirut, the hijacking and bombing of multiple aircraft, including Pan Am 103 (259 
onboard plus additional people on the ground killed), and the kidnapping and 
assassination of multiple State Department and military personnel.115  The Reagan 
Administration had reason to believe Libya was a state sponsor for many, though not all, 
of these attacks.  This conviction of Libyan complicity and the precedent of intense and 
frequent attacks arguably imbued administration rhetoric and communicated a sense of 
urgency for Libyan compliance with U.S. demands.     
Adequate domestic and international support for influencing state.  The U.S. 
influence attempt did not meet this goal.  The Reagan Administration made repeated calls 
in speeches, statements, and interviews for international solidarity in the fight against 
states sponsoring terrorism, specifically including solidarity in the use of economic and 
diplomatic sanctions.  Though there were some signs of support in the second half of his 
Administration, including the expulsion of 100 Libyan “diplomats” and businessmen 
from Western Europe and a decrease in European crude oil imports from Libya, 116 the 
U.S. received minimal support from European allies in the use of force against Libya.  
 
114 Ronald Bruce St John, “Lessons from Qadhafi,” Foreign Policy In Focus, 14 March 2003; available from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanctions/libya/2003/0314us.htm; accessed 8 September 2003. 
115 U.S. Department of State, “Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2001: A Chronology”; available from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html; accessed 24 August 2004. 
116 Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Armacost, 30 June 1986, in U.S. Department of State. 
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986, (Washington, D.C., 1987), 453. 
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Though the British allowed U.S. aircraft to take off from England, the French denied the 
U.S. military overflight of their country.  At the heart of this lack of allied solidarity was 
the difference in European and U.S. interests.  In particular European nations stood to 
benefit from conciliatory relations with Libya both in terms of the development and 
import of energy resources and in terms of their individual national security.117   
Target state’s fear of unacceptable consequences.  There are no indications that 
the U.S. threatened “unacceptable” consequences, be they conventional or non-
conventional, nor that Qadhafi interpreted the U.S. threats to be grave in nature.  In fact, 
Qadhafi considered that U.S. actions, namely the use of force to influence him, were a 
failure and that the newly elected Bush Administration would have to resort to 
negotiations.  “The Americans must understand that the policy of force, threats, fleet and 
siege have failed, that they have to negotiate with Libya.”118    
Clarity concerning precise terms of settlement.  Though Reagan did provide the 
criteria for improved relations between the states, they were likely too costly for Qadhafi: 
“…we are prepared to improve our relationship with Libya if and only if there is a 
complete and lasting reversal of Qadhafi’s support for international terrorism and his 
subversion of governments.”119  Given Qadhafi’s revolutionary ideals and his view of 
terrorism as a legitimate tool in his ideological struggle against imperialism, history has 
demonstrated that he was unwilling at this time to fully renounce terrorism and 
subversion. 
2. Deterrence Analysis 
Concurrent with the compellence policy against ongoing Libyan terrorist and 
WMD activities was a policy to deter those same activities in the future.   The Reagan 
Administration’s rhetoric was at times explicitly cost-benefit oriented and described the 
isolation and military action as a means of increasing Libya’s cost in future foreign policy 
ventures.  For example, the State Department issued a statement that “The United States 
 
117 See Judith Miller, “Europe’s Unease.” New York Times, 14 April 1986, A6 [information online]; available from Lexis-Nexis, 
<http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 24 August 2004).  See also Ronald Bruce St John, 2002, 132-134. 
118 Paul Delaney, “Quick Peek, From Afar, at Libyan Plant.”  New York Times, 8 January 1989, section 1 [information online]; 
available from Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 24 August 2004).   
119 President Reagan, Interview, 11 June 1985, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 
1985.  (Washington, D.C.: 1986), 601. 
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believes the appropriate response to Qadhafi’s policies remains one of isolating Libya 
and minimizing Libya’s presence abroad to demonstrate to Qadhafi the cost of his 
objectionable policies and to limit his capacity to take harmful actions.”120   
In addition to framing a deterrence situation as a cost-benefit calculation, there are 
other criteria that identify the existence of a deterrence policy.  First, it must be 
demonstrated that the target state had an intention to take a particular course of action.  It 
is clear from Libyan behavior throughout the eighties, including their support for various 
terrorist organizations and refusal to renounce terrorism, that their intention during this 
period was to use terrorism as a tool of foreign policy.  Furthermore, by the creation of 
the Rabta chemical weapons complex, it is clear that Qadhafi had an intention to create 
chemical weapons of some kind and of some quantity.121  Second, there are four criteria 
for evaluation of any deterrence situation and each will be briefly examined here.   
Influencing state identified action as unacceptable and Influencing state signaled 
a resolve to punish that behavior.  As has been demonstrated above, the U.S. repeatedly 
decried Libya’s terrorist behavior and threatened, prior to the actual use of military force 
in 1986, the use of harsher measures if Libya did not change its behavior.  The actual use 
of force in 1986 should have strengthened this deterrence threat and arguably may have 
temporarily strengthened the threat based on the lull in activity after the air strikes.   
Influencing state demonstrated resolve and Influencing state maintained a 
credible capability to enact threatened punishment.  The United States demonstrated its 
resolve to punish terrorism in the 1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon air strikes.  
Furthermore, they maintained a credible capability to enact any future punishment 
through the deployment of U.S. Sixth Fleet and Air Force assets in the region throughout 
this period.  Finally, the tit-for-tat exchanges of conventional force outside of Operation 
El Dorado Canyon between the Libyan naval and air forces and the U.S. Navy 
demonstrated a willingness on the part of the U.S. to use force.122
 
120 Statement issued by the Department of State, 15 March 1988, in U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, 1988. (Washington, D.C.: 1989), 432. 
121 Though a convincing argument could be made for it, it is not certain, based on the previous two intention statements, that 
any WMD created at Rabta would have been used by Libyan sponsored terrorists.   
122 The U.S. and Libya exchanged conventional force a total of five times during the eighties, beginning in mid-August 1981 
and concluding in early January 1989.   
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D. ASSESSED EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGY 
During this period of time, the U.S. influence efforts failed to change Libyan 
behavior with respect to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction.  Noted Libyan scholar 
Ronald Bruce St John argues that despite the efforts of the Reagan Administration, 
Qadhafi’s foreign policy did not change during the eighties in “content or direction.”123  
Commenting on the failure of the 1986 air strikes to achieve the desired change in Libyan 
policy, St John writes, 
While there were significant shifts in the foreign and domestic policies of 
the Libyan government in the coming twelve months….few of them 
supported the objectives articulated by the Reagan administration when it 
launched the attack.  After a period of seclusion, Colonel Qaddafi returned 
to the world stage with the major tenets of his policies intact.  His support 
for state-sponsored terrorism might now be more circumspect, but he 
remained adamantly opposed to the international status quo and 
determined to employ all of Libya’s resources to overthrow it.124
 
St John’s conclusion is borne out in the Pan Am and UTA bombings in 1988 and 
1989, respectively, and the evidence cited above of continued Libyan support to various 
terrorist organizations throughout the world.125     
The most critical of the factors affecting the failure of U.S. efforts to both compel 
Libyan behavior change and deter future support of terrorism was likely Qadhafi’s 
motivation to prevail and the lack of international support to Reagan’s policies.  There 
are indications that, despite an uprising by the Libyan army following Operation El 
Dorado Canyon, the 1986 air strikes largely served to rally domestic support behind 
Qadhafi, strengthening him in his revolutionary struggle against U.S. imperialism.   
The April 1986 bombing raid, designed by the United States to promote 
the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, had the opposite effect as it actually 
strengthened his hold on power.  While the attack did little to rally the 
masses around Qaddafi, it invigorated a radical minority, and at the same 
 
123 St John, 2002, 122. 
124 Ibid., 138. 
125 Ibid., 151. 
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time, discredited and demoralized regime opponents in and outside Libya.  
Qaddafi seized the moment to consolidate his domestic position….126
 
Furthermore, the continued diplomatic and economic engagement by Libya’s 
primary trade partners in Europe weakened U.S. punitive measures by provided 
petroleum markets and developmental support to fill the void left by United States. 
E. CONCLUSION  
U.S.-Libyan relations deteriorated significantly during the Reagan 
Administration.  After numerous terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and interests 
overseas, the Reagan Administration, being convinced of Libyan complicity, applied a 
strategy of deterrence and compellence to both punish Tripoli for their support of terrorist 
groups such as Abu Nidal, and also to deter future support.  In their compellence strategy, 
the Reagan Administration went so far as to conduct air strikes against Libyan targets in 
Benghazi and Tripoli.  This use of force was useful later to back up Reagan’s threats 
against the newly discovered chemical weapons complex at Rabta.  Ultimately, with 
terrorism as their primary concern, the Reagan Administration applied the same 
terrorism-based compellence and deterrence policy to Libya’s pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction.  In the end, however, the policy failed to facilitate any substantial change in 
Libyan behavior on either issue.  Though there was a lull after the 1986 El Dorado 
Canyon air strikes, the Libyan government demonstrated their continued involvement in 
terrorism with the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings.  Furthermore, though Libya 
would cease activity at the Rabta chemical plant in the early nineties, they subsequently 
began construction on a hardened, underground chemical weapons complex in Tarhuna. 
Though vigorously applied, U.S. efforts were not able to prevail against Qadhafi’s 
motivation to resist and the lack of international support.  
 
126 St John, 2002, 144. 
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IV. GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
A. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 U.S.-Libyan relations during the first Bush Administration were characterized 
initially by rhetorical and diplomatic exchanges over WMD, specifically indications of 
Libyan intent to develop chemical weapons at the Rabta Plant.  Later, after the November 
14, 1991 indictment of two Libyans for the Pan Am 103 bombing, Libyan sponsorship of 
terrorism again took center stage in U.S. influence policy.  The primary U.S. actions 
taken during this period included continued support for the national state of emergency 
and economic sanctions established with Executive Orders 12543 and 12544, increased 
flight restrictions on aircraft going to or coming from Libya (April 1992)127, and the 
freezing of an additional $260 million in Libyan assets (for a total of $950 million).128  
There were no exchanges of force between Libya and the United States during the Bush 
Administration, though notably, the U.S. did conduct their largest and most successful 
military operation since Vietnam—Operation Desert Storm.  The most significant event 
during this period with respect to the U.S. influence strategy against Libya was the 
imposition of UN sanctions against Libya.  The United States and United Kingdom were 
instrumental in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 731, a 
resolution formally calling on Libya to support the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombing 
investigations.  Libyan refusal to comply with UN demands resulted in the passage of 
multilateral international sanctions (UNSCR 748).    
B. CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF INFLUENCE STRATEGY RELATED 
EVENTS 
1. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
George H.W. Bush assumed the presidency on the heels of the discovery of 
Libya’s construction of the Rabta chemical weapons complex.  Upon the Reagan 
Administration’s investigation of the construction of the Rabta complex, it was 
determined that other countries, namely West Germany, were assisting Libya in 
 
127 Notice on Continuation of Libyan Emergency, 14 December 1992, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
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construction and infrastructure development.129  To counter this, the U.S. applied 
diplomatic pressure to these third-party countries to cease their support to Libya.  This 
pressure was continued into the Bush Administration in what was described as a “major 
diplomatic campaign” to end outside support to Qadhafi’s chemical weapons efforts.  
Further, State Department officials described the Bush Administration’s policy against 
Libya as part of a larger diplomatic effort against the production and proliferation of 
chemical weapons (CW): 
…Libya’s attempts to acquire full-scale CW production capability 
dramatically illustrate the need for concerted and energetic action.  Our 
goal remains a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban 
on CW….The United States…launched a major diplomatic campaign 
aimed at ending critical foreign assistance to Libya’s CW program.  We 
will continue to strongly pursue this effort in order to ensure that our allies 
and others remain vigilant to Libya’s attempts to acquire full-scale CW 
capability.130
 
This larger effort also included U.S. efforts to end chemical weapon production 
and proliferation through the United Nations Geneva Conference on Disarmament.131    
A fire at the Rabta complex in March of 1990 appeared to have taken the facility 
out of commission and there was some speculation that the United States was involved.  
However, President Bush denied U.S. involvement in an interview two days after the fire.  
“The best intelligence that I’ve had…is uncertain as to whether this was an accident or 
some incident of sabotage.  I have stated without fear of contradiction that the United 
States was not involved in any sabotage activity.”132  U.S. and French intelligence reports 
later indicated that there was actually little damage done to the complex by the fire and as 
 
129 Joshua Sinai reports that other countries reportedly involved in the construction and development of chemical weapons 
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a result, many speculated the fire was purposely set to prevent the U.S. from taking 
coercive actions along the lines of Operation El Dorado Canyon.133
2. Terrorism    
Despite the initial precedence given to Libyan chemical weapons efforts, 
terrorism remained a central concern of the Bush Administration.  Speaking forthrightly 
about Libya in December of 1989, President Bush charged that there had been no 
evidence of Libyan behavior change with respect to terrorism, and as such, U.S. policy 
had not changed.  Furthermore, in this statement he set forth the U.S. expectation for 
improved relations with Libya—renunciation of terrorism:  
I’ll simply say that we have not changed our view on Libya.  I know that 
some countries are reaching out a little more today to Libya; we are not.  
We have not seen the hard evidence that we’d like to see to show a 
renunciation of international terror.  And until we do, there will be no 
improved relations between the United States and Libya.134
 
Again in April of that next year, he reiterated the importance of Libyan 
renunciation of terrorism to improved relations with the United States: “Good will begets 
good will…I would say a verifiable renunciation of terror is terribly important, for 
example, in the case of Libya, if we are to have better relations there.”135
President Bush continued both the national emergency and economic sanctions 
against Libya during his first six-month review of Executive Orders 12543 and 12544 
and thereafter throughout his time in office.136  In so doing, he signaled that Libya had 
not made changes to their foreign policy behavior sufficient to result in altering of U.S. 
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policy.  In his letter to Congress continuing the national emergency with Libya on Jan 4, 
1990, Bush set forth his Administration’s position against the Libyan government.  In the 
letter Bush charged Qadhafi with continued support of terrorism and articulated his 
Administration’s belief, just like that of the Reagan Administration, that economic 
sanctions would limit Qadhafi’s ability to support and use terrorism as a tool of foreign 
policy:      
The crisis between the United States and Libya that led to former 
President Reagan’s declaration of a national emergency on January 7, 
1986, has not been resolved.  The Government of Libya continues to use 
and support international terrorism, in violation of international law and 
minimum standards of human behavior.  Such Libyan actions and policies 
pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security 
and vital foreign policy interests of the United States.  For these reasons, I 
have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force the broad 
authorities necessary to apply economic pressure to the Government of 
Libya to reduce its ability to support international terrorism.137
 
The periodic review of existing Executive Orders against Libya became a 
powerful way of affirming and continuing the existing U.S. compellence and deterrence 
policy against Libya.  As is clear in the language of these Executive Orders, the primary 
reason for both was the threat posed by Libyan terrorist activity.  However, the Bush 
Administration eventually highlighted chemical weapons production as yet another 
foreign policy action by Tripoli necessitating the existing influence policy.  This linking 
of WMD to the existing influence strategy was first articulated by the Bush 
Administration in the mid-1991 review of Executive Order 12543: 
The policies and actions of the Government of Libya, such as support for 
terrorism, and international destabilization and the pursuit of offensive 
weapons systems, particularly chemical weapons, continue to pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy 
of the United States.138
 
 
137 Ibid.   
138 President Bush, “Message to the Congress Reporting on the Economic Sanctions Against Libya,” 9 July 1991, in Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1991, Book II, (Washington, D.C.: 1992), 852. Emphasis added. 
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3. International Involvement 
Both the Reagan and Bush Administrations went to great lengths to generate 
international support for sanctions against Libya.  These efforts were met with limited 
success.  The level of international support would change dramatically, however, with the 
determination of Libyan involvement in the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings.  On 
November 14, 1991 Scottish and American officials indicted two Libyan agents for the 
bombing of Pan Am 103.  Following this indictment, two Joint Declarations were 
published demanding first that Libya support the ongoing bombing investigations and 
subsequent judicial proceedings and second that Libya cease support to and involvement 
in international terrorism.  Specifically, the U.S.-U.K. Joint Declaration demanded the 
surrender of the suspects indicted for the Pan Am bombing, disclosure of any information 
about the bombing, and the payment of compensation to victims. 139  An additional U.S.-
U.K.-France Joint Declaration condemned terrorism and states involved in it and defined 
indirect state involvement in terrorism as “harboring, training, providing facilities, 
arming, or providing financial support or any form of protection” to terrorists.  This 
declaration also urged Libyan compliance with the Pan Am and UTA investigations and 
demanded a Libyan commitment to ceasing support for terrorism. 140   
Following the November indictment, the U.S. and United Kingdom also pressed 
for a UN resolution condemning Libyan support to international terrorism and demanding 
their full participation in the Lockerbie and UTA investigations.141  Their efforts were 
met with the successful passage of UN resolution 731.  However, UN demands on Libya 
would go unmet and as a result, the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 
748, determining that Libyan intransigence was a threat to international peace and 
security and imposing UN sanctions.  This resolution demanded immediate Libyan 
compliance with the aircraft bombing investigations and the prompt, demonstrable, 
renunciation of terrorism.  Additionally, UNSCR 748 adopted the following measures 
effective April 15, 1992: 
 
139 Declaration of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on Terrorism, 27 November 1991, in Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1991, Book II, (Washington, D.C.: 1992), 1528. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ronald Bruce St John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2002), 166. 
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 Denial of the ability of any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly other UN 
states if the same aircraft had taken off from or was to land in Libya 
 Prohibition of the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components, aircraft 
engineering or maintenance, certification of airworthiness, payment of aviation-
related insurance claims, or the issuance of new direct insurance for Libyan 
aircraft 
 Prohibition of the provision of arms or related material of all types and the 
technical advice or training relating to those arms and items  
 Reduction of Libyan personnel manning Libyan diplomatic missions and consular 
posts and restriction of the movement of those officials who remained in member 
state’s territories 
 Expulsion of and denial of entry to all Libyan personnel denied entry to or 
expelled from other States due to their involvement in terrorism 
 
On its first scheduled review of UNSCR 748 in August of 1992, the United 
Nations determined that Libya had not yet complied with the requirements of UNSCR 
731 and threatened tighter sanctions with continued non-compliance.   
C. SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE POLICY AND LIBYAN RESPONSE 
The Bush Administration continued the Reagan Administration’s influence 
strategy of compellence and deterrence through the sanctions regime established in 
Executive Orders 12543 and 12544.  This was demonstrated most effectively in the 
continuation of these same Executive Orders, without significant modification, 
throughout the Bush Administration.  Like Reagan, Bush believed these sanctions were 
the best way to limit Qadhafi’s ability to support terrorism and other objectionable 
foreign policies, such as production of chemical weapons.  Though Libya’s pursuit of a 
chemical weapons capability was an emerging concern when Bush first came into office, 
terrorism remained a central concern of his Administration and this became increasingly 
so with indications of Libyan involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing. 
As the Reagan Administration did after Operation El Dorado Canyon, President 
Bush used the precedent of U.S. use of force to influence Qadhafi’s decision-making.  In 
an interview following the November 14, 1991 indictment of the two Libyan agents, 
Bush implied the U.S. might be considering force against Libya. 
Q. Mr. President, with the indictment of two Libyan operatives in the Pan 
Am 103 bombing, would you share with us some of the options you are 
considering to isolate Libya even further?   
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President Bush…we’ve not ruled out anything.  We must keep our options 
open in responding to the incident.  But I hope you can appreciate the 
importance of keeping our options secret as well.  I don’t want to 
telegraph what we might do. 142  
 
Bush was part of the Reagan Administration’s decision to use force against Libya 
in 1986 and had as President set a precedent for successful use of force in a much larger 
capacity—Operation Desert Storm.  This more recent use of U.S. military force against 
another Arab regime was larger in scale than El Dorado Canyon, and demonstrated the 
technological lethality of U.S. forces.  Use of force by the United States in Desert Storm 
likely provided a bonus coercive effect on Qadhafi in that it bolstered the credibility of 
potential for U.S. use of force against Libya, though the actual use of force was against 
another state—Iraq.  Though Bush’s implied threatening of force likely benefited in its 
credibility from both El Dorado Canyon and Desert Storm, it was arguably too vague a 
threat to be considered coercive diplomacy against Libya.   
Despite U.S. efforts Qadhafi remained intransigent during this period of time, 
refusing to yield to international demands for compliance with the Pan Am and UTA 
investigations and refusing to renounce terrorism.  Despite this intransigence in the face 
of U.S. and international compellence efforts, Tripoli provided little appreciable support 
to terrorism during this period, indicating that the U.S. deterrence policy was successful.  
The UTA 772 bombing in 1989 was, arguably, Libya’s last major act of international 
terrorism.  Also, there are indications Tripoli’s support to terrorism actually decreased, 
including the closure of Palestinian terrorist bases.143
1. Compellence Analysis 
Why did U.S. compellence efforts fail to cause Libya to renounce terrorism 
during this period?  An examination of key elements of the compellence effort indicates 
Qadhafi’s motivation to resist influence efforts had yet to be weakened by U.S. and UN 
 
142 President Bush, Teleconference Remarks to the Southern Newspaper Publisher Association, 19 November 1991, in Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1991, Book II, (Washington, D.C.: 1992), 1486-1487. 
143 St John, 2002, 165.  Of note, Libya did not kick out its most notorious terrorism sponosoree, Abu Nidal, until Augusts of 
1998.  He was arrested on 26 August 1998 as he crossed from Libya into Egypt. 
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actions.  Also, beyond successfully gaining international support for sanctions against 
Libya, the Bush Administration did little else to communicate a sense of urgency for 
Libyan compliance to demands.        
Influencing state’s greater motivation to prevail versus target state’s motivation 
to resist.   The U.S. influence effort did not meet this criterion.  By dint of historical fact 
it is clear that Qadhafi’s motivation to resist during this period was greater than the U.S. 
and United Nations motivation to prevail.  Neither U.S. and UN sanctions nor 
international condemnation was sufficient to move him to renounce terrorism and hand 
over the Pan Am 103 suspects.  There are three possible reasons for his continued 
resistance to change.  First, Qadhafi continued to believe both in violence as a legitimate 
tool in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism and in his distinction between 
liberation movements and terrorism.  Second, Qadhafi believed the UN sanctions were 
unfairly imposed on Libya.  In an interview with the Saudi press in December 1993, 
Qadhafi argued that the Lockerbie bombing was a civil matter, and therefore had been 
inappropriately brought to the United Nations.  Furthermore, he remained committed to 
the belief that the Libyans in question would not receive a fair trial unless they were tried 
in a neutral third country. 
Q. Have you not made mistakes in your handling of the [Lockerbie] 
affair? 
Qadhafi. The sanctions against Libya are unjust and there is no fair reason 
for them.  If we had prevented the suspects from handing themselves over, 
or if we refused to have anything to do with the issue, there would have 
been a reason for this behavior towards us.  But when they named the two 
suspects, we acknowledged their presence though there are thousands of 
people called Abdelbaset; and when they said they wanted a trial we 
accepted the principle of a trial.  We did not make mistakes, but simply 
demanded that there should be a fair trial in a third country.144
 
Finally, Qadhafi may have believed the United States and its allies were seeking 
regime change instead of foreign policy change.  In his article “How to Inflate a 
Demagogue,” David Hirst argues that Qadhafi may have viewed giving up the Libyan 
 
144 “Qadhafi: The Libyan revolution has matured,” Mideast Mirror 3 Dec 1993 [information online]; available from Lexis-
Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 25 August 2004). 
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suspects as the key to his own domestic undoing.  Critically dependent upon loyalty to 
maintain his own domestic power base, surrendering the Libyan suspects would send a 
signal that loyalty is not rewarded, thus setting himself up for internal regime change.   
Gadafy depends on the loyalty of family and clan.  Members of his 
Gadaffem, and other influential tribes, are the cement which binds to him 
the institutions of the state, army, intelligence services and the 
‘revolutionary committees’.  These relationships are as vital as they are 
intricate and obscure….To yield up the pair would have been to show his 
insiders that loyalty does not pay, to strip away the aura of invincibility his 
regime enjoys, and to persuade the disparate and ineffectual émigré 
opposition…that their hour may at last be at hand….He now seems 
convinced that it is head, not the trial of the two suspects, which the West 
is after, and that nothing he could do would divert it from that purpose.  So 
he has decided to conserve his domestic power base at all costs.145
 
Adequate domestic and international support for influencing state.  The U.S. was 
successful in meeting this criterion.  Like Reagan, the Bush Administration signaled their 
determination to seek international support in compellence efforts against Qadhafi.  
Initially, the U.S. and key allies, namely France, were at cross purposes in terms of how 
each state dealt with states sponsoring terrorism.   This comes out clearly in an interview 
with French President Francois Mitterrand and President Bush in 1990.  Though 
concerned with the threat posed by Libya, France maintained diplomatic relations with 
the Qadhafi regime and pursued a different approach in managing their relations with 
Libya.    
Q. This is a question to the two Presidents.  Do you feel that one should be 
talking with countries like Iran and Libya who still do not respect our 
common values and who still condone terrorism? 
President Mitterrand…[W]e—like most countries—we have diplomatic 
relations with both Libya and Iran and, indeed, with any other regimes in 
the world that we do not like….I would add…that most Western countries 
do business with these countries, and often on a large scale.   
President Bush.  As you know, we have a different situation in terms of 
relations with Iran and Libya….And I would only add…in our country 
there’s this list of terrorism, and I would say a verifiable renunciation of 
 
145 David Hirst, “How to Inflate a Demagogue.” The Guardian, 15 April 1992, 21 [information online]; available from Lexis-
Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 25 August 2004). 
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terror is terribly important, for example, in the case of Libya, if we are to 
have better relations there.146
 
Ultimately, however, the U.S., France, and other members of the UN Security 
Council would come to an agreement after the tragedies of the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 
and establish resolutions demanding Libyan compliance with investigations and call for a 
renunciation of terrorism.     
Influencing state’s communicated sense of urgency for compliance.   The U.S. 
was not successful in communicating a sense of urgency for Libyan compliance with 
compellence demands.  Despite the strong rhetoric against Qadhafi’s support of 
terrorism, the Bush Administration did not seem to communicate a sense of urgency for 
Libyan compliance with their demands. Unlike other influence exchanges between an 
influencing and a target state that are more time-sensitive in nature, for example U.S. 
compellence efforts against Saddam Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait, this 
compellence policy, though strictly and consistently enforced, was perhaps best 
considered general compellence in the sense that it was not specific to a particular 
situation and reflected a desire from the influencing state to achieve a substantive, but not 
necessarily time sensitive, change in the target state’s foreign policy. 
2. Deterrence Analysis 
Although the Bush Administration used less traditional deterrence language, their 
deterrence policy was, like that of the Reagan Administration, implied in the larger 
compellence policy.  Not only was the Bush Administration attempting to stop Qadhafi’s 
support to terrorism and production of chemical weapons, they were also attempting to 
prevent future activities along these lines.  Based on the Administration excerpts and 
actions provided above, it is clear the Bush Administration identified both terrorism and 
production of chemical weapons as unacceptable, signaled their resolve to punish 
continued behavior through economic sanctions and the state of national emergency, 
demonstrated their resolve through the continued extension of Executive Orders 12543 
 
146 Joint News Conference of President Bush and President Francois Mitterrand in Key Largo, Florida, 19 April 1990, in Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990, Book I, (Washington, D.C.: 1991), 528-529. 
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and 12544, and maintained a credible capability to enact either an economic or military 
punishment as needed or desired. 
The deterrence policy was largely successful with regard to terrorism after the Pan 
Am 103 bombing, as evidenced by Tripoli’s decreasing support to terrorist groups and 
most notably the absence of any significant Libyan terrorist against U.S. interests.   The 
deterrence policy was less successful with regard to weapons of mass destruction.  
Though the fire at the Rabta complex appeared to signal a decrease in chemical weapons 
capability, the Libyans were at the same time constructing an even larger, hardened 
chemical weapons facility at Tarhuna.  Concerns over this facility would emerge later 
during the Clinton Administration.  
D. ASSESSED EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGY 
The primary success of the U.S. influence strategy during this period was gaining 
the support of the international community in actions against Libya, namely in the 
passage of UNSCRs 731 and 748.  Interestingly, though, the passage of these resolutions 
is not necessarily attributable directly to the U.S. influence strategy and rather is more 
likely the result of Libyan actions—the bombing of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772—and 
their subsequent refusal to support the investigations of those incidents.  Though the U.S. 
suffered many casualties in the Pan Am 103 bombing, other nations were also affected by 
both bombings and were accordingly propelled to action to remedy these injustices.  The 
Bush Administration for their part did maintain the strength of the U.S. sanctions against 
Libya and added to them the additional concern of Libyan chemical weapons production.  
Though these sanctions, both U.S. and UN, would appear to be ineffective in facilitating 
Libyan behavior change during the Bush Administration, they would prove effective in 
the longer term.  This point and others will be developed in the examination of the 
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations in chapters V and VI. 
E. CONCLUSION  
The Bush Administration’s influence strategy, a continuation of that begun by the 
Reagan Administration, was largely unsuccessful in facilitating Libyan behavior change 
with regard to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.  Tripoli remained intransigent, 
even in the face of international condemnation and UN resolutions, concerning the 
handover of the Pan Am 103 suspects and the renunciation of terrorism.   The U.S. 
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deterrence strategy, however, showed signs of success in that Libya began decreasing its 
support for terrorist groups operating in Libya and did not conduct any more major 
attacks against U.S. interests worldwide.   
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V. WILLIAM CLINTON ADMINISTRATION  
A. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Despite the discovery of continued Libyan efforts to develop their chemical 
weapons capability,147 the primary source of friction between the United States and 
Libya during the Clinton Administration was Libya’s continued support to terrorism—
more specifically, their unwillingness to renounce terrorism and support the Pan Am 103 
and UTA 772 investigations as mandated in UNSCRs 713 and 748.  At the outset of his 
administration, President Clinton called for tightening international sanctions against 
Libya, including a worldwide oil embargo.  Though an oil embargo was never agreed 
upon, the United Nations did strengthen punitive measures against Libya with the 
passage of Resolution 883 (November 1993).  Clinton also tightened U.S. sanctions in 
1996 with the establishment of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).  In an effort yet 
again to limit cash inflows to the Iranian and Libyan regimes, this very controversial 
legislation applied sanctions to non-U.S. corporations for investing in Iran and Libya.  
U.S. allies in Europe disagreed strongly with what they considered an “extraterritorial” 
application of U.S. laws to European businesses and by May 1998 the Clinton 
Administration made concessions to ease relations with the European Union.   
U.S. influence strategy began to take a turn in late 1998 when the Clinton 
Administration took the first steps toward conditional engagement with Libya.  In an 
effort described by Secretary of State Albright as “a way to call the Libyan Government’s 
bluff,” the Clinton Administration acceded to Libya’s demand that the Pan Am 103 trial 
be moved to a neutral third country—the Netherlands—in exchange for the handover of 
the suspects.148  In April of 1999, Qadhafi handed over the two suspects for trial, 
resulting in the suspension of UN sanctions.  Later that same month, the Clinton 
Administration modified U.S. sanctions, but did not lift them, arguing that Libya still had 
to fulfill remaining UN requirements, the renunciation of terrorism, cessation of support 
 
147 By 1996 the U.S. intelligence determined the Tarhuna complex would be operational as early as 1997 and when complete 
would be the largest chemical weapons complex in the world.   
148 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. “Statement on venue for trial of Pan Am #103 Bombing 
Suspects,” 24 August 1998; available from http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980824a.html; accessed 4 September 
2004. 
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to terrorist activities, and full compliance with the Pan Am and UTA investigations.  
Further, the U.S. required that Libya accept responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and 
pay compensation to victim’s families.   
B. CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF INFLUENCE STRATEGY RELATED 
EVENTS 
1. Terrorism 
President Clinton made it clear at the outset of his administration that resolution 
of the Pan Am 103 bombing was the primary issue to improving relations with Libya.  In 
an interview with Egypt’s President Mubarak, Clinton articulated U.S. policy towards 
Libya: 
The question was about our policies with regard to Libya.  Well, as you 
know, we have one huge barrier that overrides everything else right now, 
and that is the determination of the United States to see that the people 
who have been charged with the Pan Am 103 disaster are released from 
Libya and subject to a legitimate trial….It is an enormous issue in the 
United States, and nothing else really can be resolved with regard to Libya 
until that issue is resolved.149
 
In the same interview, Clinton threatened tougher sanctions in absence of Libyan 
compliance.  “The President [Mubarak] and I discussed this today.  I think that it is 
inevitable that we will press for tougher sanctions if the Government of Libya does not 
release the people that have been charged.”150  The international community answered 
the call for tighter sanctions against Libya in the passage of UNSCR 883 in November 
1993.  Citing 20 months of non-compliance with previous UN resolutions (731 and 748), 
UNSCR 883 ordered the freezing of all funds and financial resources owned or controlled 
by the Government of Libya, with the exception of petroleum related funds, and 
expanded the list of equipment that member states were prohibited from selling to 
Libya—primarily petroleum infrastructure-related equipment. 151  Unlike its 
 
149 “The President’s News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,” 6 April 1993; available from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 1993 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004. 
150 Ibid. 
151 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 883, 11 November 1993; available from 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm ; accessed 4 September 2004. 
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predecessors, UNSCR 883 provided explicit assurances that sanctions would be 
suspended with both the handover of the Lockerbie suspects and compliance with the 
UTA investigation, and lifted entirely after full compliance with UNSCRs 731 and 748. 
Following UNSCR 883, the Clinton Administration subsequently reinforced the 
U.S. trade embargo by prohibiting the re-export of U.S. originated goods from third party 
countries to Libya, including equipment used in the refining and transportation of oil.152  
Furthermore, Clinton called for even stronger measures against Libya, including a world-
wide oil embargo: 
The United States continues to believe that still stronger international 
measures than those mandated by UNSC Resolution 883, including a 
worldwide oil embargo, should be enacted if Libya continues to defy the 
international community.  We remain determined to ensure the 
perpetrators of the terrorist acts against Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 are 
brought to justice.153
 
Clinton’s determination to increase pressure on state sponsors of terrorism would 
reach its peak in late 1996.  During the first few years of his administration, the U.S. had 
suffered a series of minor attacks on persons overseas and at least two major attacks: the 
1993 World Trade Center car bombing and the 1996 Khobar Towers truck bombing.  
Additionally, the world witnessed the first use of chemical weapons in a terrorist attack in 
1995 when the Aum Shinri-kyu cult used Sarin gas against passengers in two different 
Tokyo subway stations.  In mid-1995 Clinton began speaking about the nexus of rogue 
states, international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction and the need to contain 
states involved in these activities, namely Iran, Iraq, and Libya.154  The outcome of this 
discussion was a three-part strategy aimed at eliminating terrorism, step one being the 
containment of state sponsors.  To that end, Clinton signed the five-year Iran-Libya 
 
152 “Message to the Congress on Libya,” 10 February 1994; available from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
from the 1994 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 
August 2004. 
153 Ibid. 
154“Remarks at the World Jewish Congress Dinner in New York City,” 30 April 1995; “Remarks to the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee Policy Conference,” 7 May 1995; “Remarks on American Security in a Changing World at George Washington 
University,” 5 August 1996, and “The Presidents Radio Address,” 19 August 1996; available from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents, from the 1995 and 1996 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004.   
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Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5, 1996.  This controversial legislation placed sanctions 
on non-U.S. companies investing money in Iran or Libya.155  The intent of this measure 
was to target foreign investment in Iranian and Libyan petroleum sectors; in so doing, the 
U.S. hoped to limit Iranian and Libyan capabilities to finance terrorist operations and 
weapons of mass destruction programs. 156   
ILSA was not well received by U.S. allies, particularly European countries who 
felt that U.S. laws were being applied extraterritorially to their citizens.  As discussed in 
previous chapters, Europe and the United States were not always in agreement on how to 
manage terrorist threats, with European states generally preferring, on a state-to-state 
level, diplomacy and engagement with Libya over sanctions and coercive diplomacy.  To 
avoid a major trade dispute between the U.S. and the EU, its largest trade and investment 
partner, Clinton waived ILSA sanctions against the first European-based sanctions 
violator in May of 1998.  This waiver and the U.S. promise of future waivers for similar 
violators were accompanied by assurances from the EU of increased cooperation on non-
proliferation and counter-terrorism issues.157
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Though terrorism was the primary sticking point in the U.S.-Libyan relationship 
during the Clinton Administration, Libya’s continued pursuit of a chemical weapons 
capability became an issue again in 1996.  Concerns emerged around this time that Libya 
was nearing completion of a large, secure chemical weapons complex at Tarhuna, which 
when complete would be the largest underground chemical weapons plant in the 
world.158  Then Secretary of Defense William Perry made it clear in an interview that the 
United States had no intention of allowing the plant to become fully operational, hinting 
 
155 “ILSA requires the President to impose at least two out of a menu of six sanctions on foreign companies that make an 
‘investment’ of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector, or $40 million in one year in Libya’s energy sector.” 
Kenneth Katzman, “The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA),” CRS Report for Congress, 2; available from 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23591.pdf; accessed 4 September 2004. 
156 “Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and an Exchange with Reporters,” 5 August 1996; available 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 1996 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004.  Also, Katzman, 1. 
157 Katzman, 4. Also, “The President’s News Conference with European Union Leaders in London, United Kingdom,” 18 May 
1998; available from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 1998 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; 
available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004.   
158 Philip Shenon, “Perry, in Egypt, Warns Libya to Halt Chemical Weapons Plant.” New York Times, 4 April 1996, A6 
[information online]; available from Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 4 September 2004). 
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at a willingness to use force, even nuclear weapons, as needed.159  Qadhafi’s response 
was to claim that the Tarhuna complex was part of his Great Man-Made River Project to 
provide better irrigation to northern Libya and not a chemical weapons plant.160   
Despite the threatened use of force, Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth 
Bacon followed up the Perry statements with assurances that the United States was 
pursuing diplomatic and economic tools as a “first line of defense” against the 
completion of Tarhuna: 
[O]ur first line of preventive defense is diplomacy.  Diplomacy has 
worked in this connection before.  We believe it will work again.  We’re 
not trying to saber-rattle in this.  We want to be very clear.  We are not 
talking about using nuclear weapons against the Tarhuna Plant.161
 
True to form, the Clinton Administration did pursue this issue further via 
diplomatic means—the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC).162    
C. SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE POLICY AND LIBYAN RESPONSE 
It is clear that Clinton believed in the fundamental building blocks of the U.S. 
influence policy toward Libya, namely the denial of resources needed to fund terrorism 
and produce WMD.  He validated and strengthened the previously established 
compellence and deterrence policy by continuing the national emergency and sanctions 
regime throughout his administration; he called repeatedly for tighter international 
 
159 Given the hardened nature of the Tarhuna complex, the U.S. would likely have had to use a nuclear weapon to penetrate the 
facility and cause the desired level of damage.  “The plant also is virtually impregnable to conventional air attack because of three 
450-foot-long tunnels, protected above by 100 feet of sandstone and several feet of reinforced concrete…Apparently, only a direct hit 
on the top of the mountain with a nuclear warhead would be capable of destroying the facility.” Joshua Sinai, “Libya’s Pursuit of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997): 95.  
160 Shenon.  Also, Lauren Newhous, “Libya Profile: Chemical Chronology: 1920-2001,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Homepage; 
available from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/3951.html; accessed 4 September 2004. 
161 U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Kenneth Bacon. “DoD News Briefing,” 7 
May 1996; available from http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/1996/t050796_t0507asd.html; accessed 31 October 2003. 
162 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was created to ensure the disarmament of chemical weapons under precise 
international controls.  Signatories pledged to destroy their existing chemical weapons and production facilities.  The convention 
punishes non-signatories by denying them access to treaty-controlled chemicals.  Initially there was disagreement between the 
executive and legislative branches on details of the convention, but the U.S. did eventually ratify the CWC on 24 April 1997.  
Information on the CWC available online from http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html; accessed 5 September 
2004. 
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sanctions against Libya in response to their unwillingness to comply with international 
demands, including a worldwide oil embargo; and at the risk of damaging relations with 
U.S. allies in Europe, he signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to further limit Libyan 
ability to sponsor terrorism.  What is unique about Clinton’s approach to Libya, however, 
is that after having strengthened the compellence and deterrence policy and still having 
facilitated no change of behavior in Libya, his administration changed tactics and pursued 
a policy of limited conditional engagement—a policy which resulted ultimately in the 
handover of the two Lockerbie suspects.  
1. Compellence Analysis 
 In examining the U.S. compellence policy towards Libya during the Clinton 
Administration, there is one factor among Robert Art’s seven that argues most strongly 
for the success of that policy: Influencing state’s determination to act.  Clinton 
demonstrated a strong determination to act against terrorism in particular in his tough 
stand against Qadhafi’s intransigence—demanding harsher multilateral measures, such as 
a worldwide oil embargo, and threatening tougher U.S. sanctions.  Both calls were met 
with success, first in the tightening of UN sanctions (UNSCR 883) and then in the 
passage of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.  The controversial nature of ILSA, and in 
particular the damage it did to relations with U.S. allies in Europe prior to its first 
relaxation in 1998, were further testimony to Clinton’s determination to continue punitive 
measures against Libya.   
2. Deterrence Analysis 
The deterrence policy regarding Libyan support to terrorism had at last succeeded.  
Libya sponsored no major terrorist acts against U.S. interests after the 1988 Pan Am 103 
bombing and expelled its most notorious terrorist—Abu Nidal—in 1998.  The deterrence 
policy towards WMD, however, was unsuccessful.  What was the reason for this 
difference in deterrence outcomes?  In their management of the deterrence policy, the 
Clinton Administration identified terrorism or WMD-related activities as unacceptable, 
signaled a resolve to punish terrorism and WMD-related behavior, demonstrated a 
resolve, and maintained a credibility to enact the threats.  In these four steps, the Clinton 
Administration met the criteria for successful deterrence.  So why did the policy fail with 
WMD?  The likely answer is found in the way the two different issues were handled.   
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With regard to terrorism, the U.S. and UN applied ever tighter sanctions to punish 
previous terrorist-related activity and Qadhafi’s unwillingness to renounce future activity.  
With time, Qadhafi’s intransigence was met with harsher punitive measures.  The cost, 
therefore, of association with terrorism was increasingly high and, at some point in 
Tripoli’s calculations, began to outweigh the benefit of participating in such activities.  
The subject of weapons of mass destruction as an issue of contention between Libya and 
the U.S. and (and ostensibly Libya and the rest of the world) was handled much 
differently.  As previously demonstrated, concerns over Libya’s chemical weapons 
program was added to the existing terrorism-based U.S. compellence and deterrence 
policy during the Reagan Administration.  Though the international community joined in 
a strong consensus against Libyan support to terrorism after Lockerbie and UTA 772, 
there was no similar consensus against Libyan WMD activities, and therefore no WMD-
related multilateral sanctions.  Instead of strongly pursuing punitive measures for WMD 
in particular, the U.S. instead sought international diplomatic channels to increase the 
cost, namely the Paris Chemical Weapons Convention of 1989 and later George H.W. 
Bush’s “major diplomatic campaign.”  According to Thomas Wiegele, an expert on 
Libyan chemical weapons programs, the week-long Paris conference served to make the 
world aware of the problematic nature of chemical weapons, but did not go far in 
pressuring Libya to cancel its program: 
If the United States conceived of the conference as a mechanism to alert 
the world to general problems of chemical weaponry, the conference was 
probably as success.  If, however, the aim of the conference was to put 
pressure on Libya to halt its activities at Rabta, the conference must be 
considered something short of successful.163
 
Furthermore, though Bush’s diplomatic campaign likely had some success on limiting 
allied support to WMD infrastructure development in Libya, these diplomatic efforts 
were insufficient to deter Libyan WMD production.  Though Tripoli temporarily ceased 
production at the Rabta plant in the early nineties, the Tarhuna plant, an even larger and 
more hardened facility was later discovered in 1996.  As will be demonstrated in the 
 
163 St John, 2002, 160; quoting Thomas C. Wiegele, The Clandestine Building of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Factory: A Study 
of International Collusion (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 68-69. 
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George W. Bush chapter, Libya’s WMD activities would eventually include a 
rudimentary nuclear program which they would fully not admit and ultimately cancel 
until 2003.   
3. Conditional Engagement Analysis 
In a small but dramatic change of policy towards Libya, the Clinton 
Administration acceded to Libyan demands that the Pan Am 103 trial take place in a 
neutral third party country—the Netherlands.  The announcement of this concession by 
then Secretary of State Albright in August of 1998 was accompanied by an admission 
that sanctions were not working to bring the Lockerbie case to trial and a new approach 
was needed.  Though this was a non-punitive move, a first in U.S. policy towards Libya, 
the offer was accompanied by very clear boundaries:   
[T]oday, I’m announcing another effort to bring terrorists to justice.  It has 
been a decade since Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, 
Scotland….Unfortunately, year after year has passed without resolution.  
The sanctions have not altered Libyan intransigence….The cause of 
justice was not being served….We now challenge Libya to turn promises 
into deeds…the plan the US and UK are putting forward is a “take-it-or-
leave-it” proposition.  It is not subject to negotiation or change, nor should 
it be subject to additional foot dragging.164
 
The United Nations welcomed this concession and shortly thereafter passed 
UNSCR 1192 reaffirming previous resolutions, assuring the immediate suspension of 
sanctions with the handover of the suspects, and threatening additional punitive action 
should Libya delay further.165  Four months later, after having received mixed signals 
from Qadhafi, President Clinton made reference to the Netherlands offer and threatened 
additional punitive action should the trial be delayed further:   
Since then the Libyan leader, Mr. Qadhafi, has given us mixed signals.  
We believe there is still some possibility he will accept our offer…But let 
me be absolutely clear to all of you: Our policy is not to trust Mr. 
Qadhafi’s claims; it is to test them.  This is a take-it-or-leave-it offer.  We 
will not negotiate its terms...if the suspects are not turned over by the time 
 
164 Albright. 
165 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1192, 27 August 1998; available from 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm; accessed 4 September 2004. 
67 
                                                
of the next sanctions review, we will work at the United Nations with our 
allies and friends to seek yet stronger measures against Libya.166
 
These positive incentives coupled with threats of punitive action were a clear sign 
of an effort to engage Libya in order to facilitate behavior change.  The engagement was 
conditional in that the U.S. expectation was a reciprocation of concessions by Libya in 
the form of the handover of the two Lockerbie suspects.  Given the lack of trust between 
the two countries and the lack of success of the compellence and deterrence policy in 
facilitating the handover of the suspects, conditional engagement had great potential to be 
successful—and ultimately it was. 
On April 5, 1999, the 13th anniversary of the Berlin La Belle discothèque 
bombing, the Libyan government handed over to British Authorities the two Pan Am 103 
suspects, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.  As promised, UN 
sanctions were immediately suspended, but not lifted; U.S. sanctions were modified, but 
also were not lifted.  In his July 19, 1999 message to Congress on the national emergency 
with Libya, Clinton reported he had eased the trade embargo with respect to commercial 
sales of agricultural commodities and products, medicine, and medical equipment; 
however the national emergency and economic sanctions would remain.  Though U.S. 
and Libyan relations were finally moving in the direction of reconciliation, the Clinton 
Administration maintained that Libya must fully comply with UN resolutions: “We will 
insist that Libya fulfill the remaining UNSCR requirements for lifting UN sanctions and 
are working with UN Secretary Annan and UN Security Council members to ensure that 
Libya does so promptly.”167
The Clinton Administration made clear their expectation that, in keeping with UN 
and U.S. demands, the Government of Libya would take concrete steps to demonstrate a 
renunciation of terrorism, cease all forms of terrorist action, including assistance to 
 
166 “Remarks on the 10th Anniversary of the Pan Am Flight 103 Tragedy in Arlington, Virginia,” 21 December 1998; available 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 1998 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004. 
167 “Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency with Respect to Libya,” 19 July 1999; available from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 1999 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004. 
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terrorist groups, acknowledge responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bombing, and pay 
restitution to the victim’s families.  In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
Africa Ronald Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, clearly 
laid out this expectation: 
Only when Libya has complied fully…will we be able to consider lifting 
U.S. Sanctions.  Right now, such steps would be premature….We expect 
Libya to fulfill all of the UNSC requirements, renounce and end all 
support for terrorist activities, acknowledge responsibility for the actions 
of its officials, cooperate with the trial…and pay appropriate 
compensation.”168
 
Though Libya would not meet these requirements during the Clinton 
Administration, the door had been opened through conditional engagement for Libyan 
behavior change and with the continuation of this strategy of compellence and 
conditional engagement the subsequent administration would see the benefits. 
D. ASSESSED EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGY 
Clinton’s continual pressure on Libya and his pressure on the international 
community to strengthen sanctions against Libya helped to continue the economic and 
diplomatic isolation of the Qadhafi regime.  Though this was integral to achieving the 
U.S. government’s objective of limiting Qadhafi’s ability to sponsor terrorism, it was not 
effective, even after ten years (1988-1998), in forcefully persuading Qadhafi to comply 
with the Pan Am 103 trial, much less in leading the Libyan government to a renunciation 
of terrorism.  At best, the compellence and deterrence policy set the conditions in Libya 
through diplomatic and economic isolation for a favorable Libyan response to a strategy 
of limited conditional engagement.  
Clinton’s pursuit of limited conditional engagement opened the door to a series of 
small put positive steps by both states.  In addition to handing over the Lockerbie 
suspects, Qadhafi closed the Libyan training camps of infamous international terrorist 
Abu Nidal.  The Clinton Administration perceived this move as a concrete step toward 
renouncing terrorism.  A State Department spokesperson concluded, “As far as we can 
 
168 U.S. Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Testimony before House subcommittee on 
Africa. 22 July 1999; available from http://usembassy.state.gove/malta/wwwhlib2.html; accessed 31 October 2003. 
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tell, the Libyan government’s actions are not window-dressing, but a serious, credible 
step to reduce its involvement with that terrorist organization.”169  In response, the 
Clinton Administration modified sanctions as previously discussed, did not object at the 
suspension of UN sanctions, and also allowed four U.S. oil companies to travel to Libya 
to assess the status of their holdings.  Though these were small steps, they were steps 
towards facilitating the U.S. and internationally desired behavior change in Libya. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Throughout his presidency, Clinton maintained pressure on Libya to comply with 
UN resolutions regarding Libyan support of terrorism and the Pan Am 103 trial.  He 
strengthened the existing U.S. compellence and deterrence efforts by tightening U.S. 
sanctions and passing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.  His calls for increased measures 
against Libya and concurrent Libyan intransigence were met with strengthened UN 
sanctions.  After having strengthened punitive measures against Libya, his administration 
then changed tactics and began to slowly pursue a policy of limited conditional 
engagement.  U.S. willingness to accede to Libyan demands that the Lockerbie trial be 
held in a neutral third party country was met, several months later, with the handover of 
the two Lockerbie suspects. Though a small step, the handover of the Lockerbie suspects 
was a catalyst to resolution of UN resolution requirements and the necessary step towards 
improving relations with the United States.  Though Libya did not meet all UN and U.S. 
requirements during the Clinton Administration, the door was opened to further 
conditional engagement between the U.S. and Libya. 
 
169 Ronald Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, in John Lancaster, “U.S. Moves Toward Better 
Ties to Libya: Administration Cites Moderation by Gadhafi.” Washington Post, 24 December 1999, A9 [information online]; available 
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VI. GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
A. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have been the two dominant issues in 
U.S. foreign policy during the George W. Bush Administration.  Both were considered to 
be the primary threats to U.S. national security and both resulted in major military 
operations—Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  The Bush Administration combined 
harsh rhetoric with strong action in its stance against the nexus of rogue states, terrorism, 
and WMD.  After the infamous “Axis of Evil” speech, there were few in doubt 
worldwide as to the position of the United States on countries sponsoring terror or 
trafficking in WMD.  
The Bush Administration was able to achieve the long sought after goal of Libyan 
behavior change.  In August of 2003, the Libyan government accepted formal 
responsibility for the actions of convicted Lockerbie bomber, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi, 
and agreed to pay compensation to the families of those killed in the attack.170  In 
December of 2003 and later in May of 2004, the Libyan government renounced its 
pursuit of WMD, acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and announced it would 
stop all military-related trade with suspected WMD and missile proliferators North 
Korea, Iran, and Syria.171  The Bush Administration did not facilitate this change in 
Libya by its policy alone; rather, Bush built upon the influence strategy created and 
shaped by the Reagan, Bush senior, and Clinton administrations.  Having said this, the 
Bush Administration did however provide several unique contributions to the existing 
strategy that likely helped facilitate Libyan behavior change.  Two in particular are 
worthy of attention in this chapter:  first, Bush’s hard rhetoric and strong actions against 
other rogue regimes provided for a bonus coercive effect on Libyan behavior; and second, 
Bush’s willingness to continue conditional engagement with Libya, despite his hardline 
stance on rogue states, allowed for continued trust building and dialogue between the two 
states, paving the way for Libyan renunciation of terrorism and WMD. 
 
 170  The other Libyan indicted in the Lockerbie bombing, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted on 31 January 2001. 
 171 Judith Miller, “Libya Halts Military Trade with North Korea, Syria and Iran.”  New York Times, 14 May 2004, A4 
[information online]; available from ProQuest, <.http://www.proquest.umi.com/login> (accessed 1 July 2004). 
72 
                                                
B. CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF INFLUENCE STRATEGY RELATED 
EVENTS 
1. Bush Administration Policy Pre-9/11    
Shortly after Bush assumed the presidency, the Lockerbie trial concluded with 
conviction of one of the two indicted Libyans, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi.  Qadhafi’s 
reaction to the verdict was to claim that the Government of Libya had no connection with 
the Lockerbie bombing and to refuse the idea of compensating victim’s families.172  In 
the same interview, however, Qadhafi signaled that the state of Libya was willing to seek 
peaceful relations with the United States, should the U.S. choose to seek peaceful 
resolution of past conflicts.  Qadhafi declared, “If the US wants peace, we also want 
peace and we have no interest in war and confrontation.”173  When asked whether the 
conviction would result in a change in U.S. policy towards Libya, namely the lifting of 
U.S. sanctions, Bush indicated that his intention was to continue sanctions until the 
Libyan government admitted to their complicity in the Lockerbie bombing and paid 
restitution to families.174  True to his word, Bush renewed the national emergency and 
economic sanctions against Libya at each six month renewal point.  Additionally, despite 
his uncertainty over the effectiveness of sanctions, he ultimately approved a five-year 
extension of the controversial Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), arguing that the Libyan 
government had yet to meet all of the UN resolution demands.175   
2. 9/11 and the Bush Doctrine 
The audacious and piercingly tragic attacks of September 11, 2001 ushered in a 
new era in U.S. policy.  In their aftermath, the people and government of the United 
 
172 “Libya: Al-Qadhafi responds to Lockerbie verdict.” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5 February 2001 [information 
online]; available from Global NewsBank, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 19 August 2004). 
173 Ibid. 
174 “Remarks Prior to a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters,” 31 January 2001; available from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 2001 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; accessed 17 August 2004. 
175 In August of 2001 ILSA was up for its first five-year renewal.  Unlike Congressional leaders who were pressing for a full 
five-year extension, the Bush Administration wanted instead to renew ILSA for two years pending a comprehensive review of the 
effectiveness of the sanctions—arguing that ILSA had damaged allied relations and had not been effective in changing Iranian or 
Libyan behavior. Ultimately, however, the Bush Administration acceded to Congressional demands and extended the sanctions for 
five more years.  Alan Sipress, “Bush Seeks Shorter Term for Iran-Libya Sanctions.”  Washington Post, 9 June 2001, A20 
[information online]; available from Global NewsBank, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 5 September 2004).  Also, 
“Statement on Signing the ILSA Extension Act of 2001,” 3 August 2001; available from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents, from the 2001 Presidential Documents online via GPO Access; available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; 
accessed 17 August 2004. 
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States found a new resoluteness in the fight against terrorism; a swift and determined 
momentum to search out terrorists and bring them to justice.  This new paradigm guiding 
U.S. foreign policy was articulated in Presidential speeches and also in foundational 
documents such as The National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002), 
the National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002) and the 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003)  The Bush Doctrine shifted 
the U.S. approach from fighting terrorism as a law enforcement issue, as in the case of 
Pan Am 103, to an issue of war between states, terrorists, and those who sponsor and 
support them.  An administration official described it in the following manner: “We must 
eliminate the scourge of international terrorism. In order to do that, we need not only to 
eliminate the terrorists and their networks, but also those who harbor them.”176  This new 
paradigm of “offensive defense” divided the world in a binary fashion:  those supporting 
the United States in their Global War on Terror and those supporting terrorists.  Further, 
the Bush Doctrine articulated a willingness to act unilaterally and preemptively to prevent 
future attacks on U.S. persons and interests.177
The first manifestation of the Bush Doctrine was the 2001 Operation Enduring 
Freedom—a swift and effective attack on the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda elements in 
Afghanistan.  The second, more controversial manifestation was the 2003 Operation 
Iraqi Freedom—the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, removal of the Saddam 
Hussein regime, and establishment of democratic governance in Iraq.  During both of 
these operations, the Bush Administration actualized their policy against rogue regimes, 
one with terrorist links, and the other with suspected WMD links.  The Bush Doctrine 
was significant in its boldness and the momentum with which the Bush Administration 
pursued its mandates.  With the whole world attentive to U.S. foreign policy moves, it is 




176 Karen DeYoung, “Allies are Cautious on ‘Bush Doctrine’.” Washington Post, 16 October 2001, A1 [information online]; 
available from Global NewsBank, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 5 September 2004). 
177 President, Strategy Document, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C., Sep 
2002), 6. 
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3. The Road to Reconciliation 
a. British Efforts 
Despite the support and strength of the Bush Doctrine and the momentum 
following 9/11, these measures alone did not bring Libya back into the international fold.  
In conjunction with conditional engagement, British diplomacy worked in tandem with 
the Bush Administration’s hardline policy to facilitate Libyan behavior change.  The 
United Kingdom severed diplomatic ties with Libya in 1984 after policewoman Yvonne 
Fletcher was shot from a window of the Libyan embassy in London.  As with the 1988 
Lockerbie bombing, Tripoli initially refused to accept responsibility for the act; in 1999, 
however, they both accepted responsibility and agreed to pay compensation to her family.  
Britain then restored diplomatic relations and subsequently took a leading role in 
mediating the resolution of first the Lockerbie settlement and later the U.S. WMD 
concerns.  In the latter case, Libyan intelligence officials contacted British MI6 officials 
to seek their support in resolving U.S. WMD concerns as early as March 2003—just 
before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.178  Between March and December 
2003 British and U.S. diplomats worked with their Libyan counterparts to hash out the 
details of what would be Libya’s December 19 renunciation of WMD.  British diplomatic 
efforts served as a balance to U.S. punitive rhetoric and actions and provided a means to 
positive reconciliation of the Libyan relationship with the international community and 
the United States. 
b. Bush Administration Efforts 
When an appellate court upheld the Lockerbie ruling and conviction of 
Megrahi in March of 2002, the Bush Administration responded with its intention to 
maintain sanctions against Libya and oppose permanently lifting the suspended UN 
sanctions until Libya complied fully with UN resolution requirements.  In May of 2002, 
the Lockerbie legal team announced the Libyan government had agreed to a 
compensation package for the Lockerbie families.  Though Libya had now taken a second 
concrete step towards fulfilling both UN and U.S. requirements, the Bush Administration, 
perhaps reading in Libya’s moves a desire to return to the international community, 
articulated its concern about remaining UN requirements and Libyan WMD activities.  
 
178 Patrick E. Tyler, “Libyan Stagnation a Big Factor in Qaddafi Surprise.” New York Times, 7 January 2004, A1 [information 
online]; available from Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 14 September 2004).    
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The Director of Central Intelligence reported to Congress in both 2002 and 2003 that 
Libya was continuing to pursue offensive nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
capability and since the lifting of UN sanctions had renewed contacts necessary to do 
so.179  In March of 2003, just prior to commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Libyan diplomats approached their British counterparts to seek resolution to the WMD 
issue.   
In a letter to the UN in August of 2003, the Libyan government formally accepted 
responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to the previously arranged 
compensation package.  The United Nations welcomed this move and within a month 
formally lifted the sanctions it imposed first in 1992.  Though U.S. sanctions remained 
unchanged, the Bush Administration did not oppose the lifting of UN sanctions.  The 
U.S. representative to the UN, James Cunningham articulated the Bush Administration’s 
firm position and residual WMD concerns: 
Libya has now addressed the remaining UN requirements related to the 
Pan Am 103 bombing….In recognition of these steps…the United States 
has not opposed the formal lifting of the United Nations sanctions on 
Libya….Our decision, however, must not be misconstrued by Libya or by 
the world community as tacit U.S. acceptance that the Government of 
Libya has rehabilitated itself.  The United States continues to have serious 
concerns about other aspects of Libyan behavior…most important—its 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of 
delivery….The United States will intensify its efforts to end Libya’s 
threatening actions.  This includes keeping U.S. bilateral sanctions on 
Libya in full force.180
 
Finally, on 19 December 2003, after months of diplomacy, the Libyan Foreign 
Minister announced his country’s intention to renounce their pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction, including full disclosure of their programs and international verification, and 
 
179 Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002”; available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2002.html; accessed 6 September 2004.  Central Intelligence Agency, 
“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 
Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003”; available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm; accessed 6 September 2004.  
180 U.S. Department of State, “Resolution to Lift Sanctions Against Libya,” 12 September 2003; available from 
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/24068pf.htm; accessed 6 September 2004. 
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accession to the existing WMD-related protocols.181  President Bush hailed Libya’s 
decision and affirmed this step towards better relations with the United States.  In the 
months that followed this decision, the U.S. and Libya both took reciprocal positive steps 
toward reconciling the relationship.  These steps included increased diplomatic contacts, 
Libyan handover of precursor raw materials and centrifuge parts for its nuclear weapons 
program, the lifting of U.S. travel restrictions to Libya, the termination of ILSA and 
modification of U.S. sanctions, Libyan renunciation of trade with WMD and missile 
proliferators, and the restoration of direct diplomatic ties (though not full diplomatic 
relations) between the two countries. 
C. SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE POLICY  
Like those before him, Bush continued the basic U.S. compellence and deterrence 
policy against Libya, continuing the national emergency and economic sanctions, as well 
as extending the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for five more years.  What he contributed 
uniquely to facilitating Libyan behavior change, however, was a combination of a 
hardline, aggressive foreign policy doctrine and a willingness to continue limited 
engagement with Libya.  The advantage of the former was a powerful bonus coercive 
effect on Libya; the latter a continuation of trust building steps towards reconciliation.   
1. Bonus Coercive Effect 
As defined in chapter IV, bonus coercive effect refers to advantageous coercive 
influence on a third-party state based on unrelated coercive measures applied by the 
influencing state to another target state.  After 9/11 and the establishment of the Bush 
Doctrine, the Bush Administration made several foreign policy moves that, while not 
directly aimed at Libya, likely had the effect of influencing them none the less.  Actions 
taken against a series of rogue states, for issues similar to those which were problematic 
in the U.S.-Libyan relationship, may have tipped the scales towards Libyan behavior 
change.  Operation Enduring Freedom, the first actualization of the Bush Doctrine, 
received widespread international support and resulted in regime change in a rogue state 
supporting terrorists.  Operation Iraqi Freedom, the second major actualization of the 
Bush Doctrine, was a preventive war against yet another rogue state with suspected links 
to WMD and terrorism.  Though this operation received little international support, the 
 
181 White House, “Fact Sheet: The President’s National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya’s Announcement,” 19 
December 2003; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov; accessed 12 July 2004. 
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Bush Administration disregarded international criticism and acted almost unilaterally, in 
keeping with its doctrinal prescriptions.  U.S. willingness to make such a major foreign 
policy move without international backing demonstrated the power and resolve of the 
Bush Administration to neutralize perceived threats.   
Shortly after the end of Iraqi Freedom, President Bush announced a third 
actualization of his foreign policy doctrine—the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—a 
partnership of states seeking to interdict proliferation of WMD and missile technology at 
sea, in the air, or on land.  In testimony before the House International Relations 
Committee, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John 
Bolton, articulated Bush’s larger strategy to stop WMD proliferation: 
We aim ultimately not just to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to 
eliminate or “roll back” such weapons from rogue states and terrorist 
groups that already possess them or are close to doing so….While we 
pursue diplomatic dialogue wherever possible, the United States and its 
allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as (1) 
economic sanctions; (2) interdiction and seizure…and (3) as the case of 
Iraq demonstrates, preemptive military force where 
required….Proliferators—and especially states still deliberating whether 
to seek WMD—must understand that they will pay a high price for their 
efforts.182
 
Four months later, in October 2003, again demonstrating resolve behind the 
rhetoric, an American-led PSI team interdicted a German-flagged ship, BBC China, 
bound for Libya with 1000 fully assembled gas centrifuges and related components.  This 
was the first and only PSI intercept of WMD-related cargo bound for Libya.   
All these post-9/11 foreign policy moves and their bonus coercive effect served to 
strengthen U.S. compellence and deterrence policy in three particular ways.  First, the 
United States clearly communicated their determination and capability to act.  With Iraqi 
Freedom they further demonstrated a willingness and capability to protect U.S. interests 
in the face of widespread international disapproval.  Second, the attacks of 9/11 and the 
international outrage they engendered turned the tide of motivation to prevail between the 
 
182 U.S. Department of State, John R. Bolton, “Testimony before the House International Relations Committee: US Efforts to 
Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 4 June 2003; available from http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/21247.htm; accessed 6 
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U.S. as the influencing state and Libya as the target state.   Though this likely would have 
been the case regardless of how long U.S. and UN sanctions had been in place, the eleven 
years of combined sanctions set the conditions for this change in motivational tide.  
Third, Bush communicated a clear sense of urgency in his post-9/11 doctrine—“you are 
with us or you are with the terrorists”—and actions—Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom.  
Not everyone is convinced, however, that Bush Administration policies, 
particularly the war in Iraq, were the key to Libyan behavior change.  Many argued after 
Libya’s December 2003 announcement that international diplomacy and the willingness 
of first Clinton then Bush to engage in conditional engagement were the critical factors in 
Libya’s return to the international community.  In his assessment of Libyan foreign 
policy change, Flynt Leverett, senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National 
Security Council (2002-2003), argued for the application of both sticks and carrots: “The 
lesson [from Libya’s behavior change] is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime to 
get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction, we must 
not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation.”183  
2. Conditional Engagement Analysis 
In conjunction with a demonstrated hardline, coercive policy on rogue states, the 
Bush Administration left the door open to conditional engagement with Libya.  As 
described in chapter V, the Clinton Administration was the first to initiate a policy of 
limited conditional engagement with Libya in offering to move the Lockerbie trial to a 
neutral third-party country; this action resulted in the first step towards rehabilitating the 
U.S-Libya relationship—the handover of the two Lockerbie suspects.  Trust building and 
reciprocation began initially during the George W. Bush Administration with the Libyan 
government’s indications they would be willing to pay restitution to Lockerbie families.  
Though the Bush Administration welcomed a move in this direction, the dialogue turned 
rapidly to weapons of mass destruction and U.S. concerns over Libya’s proliferation 
activities.   
After Libya had formally accepted responsibility for the Pan Am bombing and 
committed to a compensation package, the dialogue between the U.S. and Libya, assisted  
183 Flynt Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb.” New York Times, 23 January 2004. 
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greatly by British diplomatic efforts, took on the language of incrementalized, conditional 
engagement.  For each step Libya would take, the U.S. would recognize and reward the 
action, acknowledging that progress had been made towards reconciliation; then the 
Administration would articulate its next expectation.  A chronological series of this 
dialogue and incremental exchange follows: 
• Libya formally acknowledged responsibility for Lockerbie.  The U.S. did 
not oppose the UN lifting sanctions and concurrently expressed concern 
over Libyan pursuit of WMD;  
• The Libyan government pledged to eliminate its WMD programs and 
corresponding missile delivery systems.  President Bush acknowledged 
this move as an important step in “the process of rejoining the community 
of nations” and urged Libya to fulfill its pledge so that relations with the 
United States could be restored184;  
• Libya took steps to fulfill its WMD pledge, including surrendering 
precursor materials and equipment.  The U.S. rescinded travel restrictions 
and invited Libya to establish an Interests Section in Washington, 
promising as Libya continued to fulfill its December 2003 pledge to 
“continuously evaluate the range of bilateral sanctions”185;  
• Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, destroyed all of its 
declared unfilled chemical munitions, and modified or destroyed key 
elements of its ballistic missile force.  In return the U.S. terminated ILSA, 
modified economic sanctions to allow resumption of most commercial 
activities, and established a U.S. Liaison Office in Tripoli.186   
 
Libyan moves were repeatedly met with U.S. political and economic rewards and 
assurances of better relations with continued progress towards elimination of their WMD 
capability.  Through this reciprocation of actions it is clear that both the U.S. and Libya 
wanted Tripoli to make the changes required to bring it back into the international 
community.  The incrementalized approach to engagement allowed trust to build between 
the countries and also provided time to verify actions by each state.   
 
 
184 White House, “Remarks by the President: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs,” 19 December 2003; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html; accessed 6 September 2004. 
185 White House, “Statement on Libya,” 26 February 2003; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040226-1.html; accessed 12 July 2004. 
186 White House, “U.S. Eases Economic Embargo Against Libya,” 23 April 2004; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040423-9.html; accessed 12 July 2004. 
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D. ASSESSED EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGY             
Ultimately, the Bush Administration’s influence strategy was successful in 
facilitating the desired Libyan behavior change.  As previously established, Bush’s policy 
was successful in part because of the work of previous administrations in isolating and 
punishing Libya for its involvement in terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.  
Eleven years of combined U.S. and UN sanctions set the conditions for successful 
conditional engagement, first in the Clinton Administration, then more fully in the Bush 
Administration.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were the tipping event in a major change in 
the motivation for both the U.S. and Libya.  The Bush Administration became resolutely 
determined to pursue terrorists, even at the cost of damaging U.S. relations with key 
allies worldwide.  Libya saw the willingness of the Bush Administration to back up its 
rhetoric with actions, including regime change in at least two rogue states.  As a result of 
this policy and of parallel diplomatic efforts by the United Kingdom, Libya acceded to 
the incrementalized conditional engagement offered by the United States.  In so doing, 
trust was slowly built between the two countries, with each able to demonstrate its 
commitment to reconciliation in concrete actions.   
E. CONCLUSION                     
Relations between the United States and Libya during the Bush Administration 
were characterized by: (1) Bush’s refusal to moderate U.S. sanctions towards Libya until 
Libya complied fully with UN resolution requirements, paid compensation to Pan Am 
103 families, and ceased its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction capabilities;  (2) Bush 
Administration rhetoric and actions against rogues, terrorism, and WMD, including two 
major military operations in the larger Global War on Terror; and (3) the piecemeal 
positive steps taken by both Libya and the U.S., in a continuation of the limited 
conditional engagement begun in the Clinton Administration.  The sea change in U.S. 
foreign policy resulting from the 9/11 attacks and the demonstration of U.S. resolve in 
fighting terrorism and WMD lent credibility to Bush’s hardline stance on sanctions 
against Libya.  He clearly was resolved that U.S. sanctions would not be modified until 
Libya met all its UN requirements with respect to terrorism and U.S. requirements 
regarding both terrorism and WMD.  When Libya demonstrated a willingness to move 
forward with reentry into the international community, the Bush Administration 
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reciprocated these positive steps with rewards and assurances of better relations with 
continued behavior change.  Both states were ready to rehabilitate the relationship, 
though slowly and through trust building measures.  The result was Libya’s renunciation 
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VII. CONCLUSION  
To complete the analysis of Libya’s behavior change regarding terrorism and 
WMD it is important to consider other factors that may have contributed to the change.  
This is especially important given the fact that similar U.S. influence strategies toward 
North Korea and Iran—compellence with both countries and limited conditional 
engagement with North Korea—have not produced the same long-term, successful 
behavior change.  It is unrealistic to assume that U.S. policy alone led Libya to renounce 
terrorism and end their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction capability.  Factors that 
may have played a role in Libyan behavior change include: the application and 
effectiveness of UN sanctions, ideological change in the world political system, namely 
the ascendancy and strength of the international economy, and domestic (Libyan) 
political factors.  This chapter will briefly assess the role of these three factors in Libyan 
behavior change and conclude with policy recommendations for future influence efforts. 
A. COMBINED SANCTIONS 
There is a debate in the literature as to whether sanctions work to facilitate 
behavior change in states.  In the Libya case, U.S. and UN sanctions worked together to 
isolate Qadhafi’s regime from the world economically and diplomatically.  Combined 
sanctions targeted Libya’s petroleum industry—its primary revenue generating 
industry.187 This was done to punish Libya for involvement in terrorism and WMD and 
also to decrease the monies available to the regime to support terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction production.  The Libyan government estimates their economy suffered 
$33 billion in losses due to UN sanctions.  The World Bank estimates this figure at $18 
billion.188  
Because the U.S. and UN sanctions were largely concurrent, it is difficult to 
determine in the long-term if either was more effective than the other.  As seen in the 
Reagan Administration analysis, U.S. sanctions alone were insufficient to facilitate 
 
187 According to New York Times reporting from 1993, Libya receives 98% of its foreign income from oil sales, with European 
states such as Spain, Germany, and Italy being the primary customers.  Institute for International Economics, “Case Studies in 
Sanctions and Terrorism,” [home page online]; available from http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/libya3.htm; accessed 13 
July 2004. 
188 Ray Takeyh, “The rogue who came in from the cold,” Foreign Affairs 80 (May/Jun 2001); available from ProQuest, 
http://proquest.umi.com/login (accessed 20 August 2003). 
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Libyan behavior change in the short-term.189  The likely reason for this is that Libya’s 
primary trading partners in Europe did not agree with the U.S. influence efforts, namely 
the use of sanctions and coercive diplomacy;190 following the U.S. lead and applying 
sanctions would only serve to hurt their own economies.  Additionally, sanctions, even 
those that are multilateral, may not be sufficient in the short-term in setting the necessary 
punitive conditions for behavior change.   
B. IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Revolutions, like revolutionaries, grow up and mature. They repent and 
learn.  Weakness creeps into their fists and doubt eats away at their 
terminology…The days of Carlos, Abu-Nidal…and the Japanese Red 
Army are gone.  The days of…the “La Belle” night club, “Lockerbie” and 
the “UTA” are gone…The genuine ones are gone and the era of proxies is 
over.  Only Castro is left alone to age in his boat, awaiting his death or an 
earthquake.191
 
A second area that may have influenced Tripoli’s change of heart was Qadhafi’s 
realization that virtually the entire world had changed ideologically and left Libya and its 
revolution behind.  Between the imposition of U.S. sanctions in 1986 and Libya’s 
renunciation of WMD in late 2003, the international system changed dramatically.  At the 
outset of the U.S.-Libyan battle for influence the world was bi-polar and Libya enjoyed a 
relationship with the Soviet Union—the primary ideological counterweight to the United 
States.  The end of the Cold War brought unipolarity under U.S. economic and political 
hegemony, and with it the ascendancy of globalization.  Anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism 
and other secular revolutionary ideals have largely dissipated in the face of global 
economic liberalization.  With multilateral sanctions in place and compounded by a 
poorly managed economy, Libya was left behind both economically and politically. 
 
189 Even though U.S. sanctions alone may not have been sufficient to produce the economic and political isolation resulting 
from the UN sanctions, there must have been something unique in having U.S. investment in Libya.  Libya pursued the lifting of U.S. 
sanctions after UN sanctions had been lifted—in effect, courting U.S. investment beyond the international investment that began after 
the UN sanctions were lifted.   
190 Ray Takeyh, “US-Libya Relations: A Way Forward?” Policy Brief, 12 April 2002, 1; available from 
http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc47.html; accessed 6 August 2004. 
191 “Arabic paper says Libyan leader showed ‘skill’ in renouncing WMD.”  BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 
December 2003 [information online]; available from Global NewsBank, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 19 August 2004). 
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Qaddafi thus spent the 1990s on the sidelines while his onetime 
revolutionary compatriots--leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Yasir 
Arafat--were feted in Washington and in European capitals.  To remain 
relevant, Qaddafi realized he had to accept the passing of the age of 
revolutions and the arrival of the age of globalization.192
 
With time, Qadhafi was seen less as a vanguard revolutionary and more as a 
meddlesome and mercurial despot.  Revolutions change with time and after years of 
isolation, Qadhafi apparently changed with them.  “Gaddafi realizes that there is no pan-
Arab nationalist revolution to lead, so he would like to end his days as the leader of a 
prosperous, secure Arab nation.”193  In his September 2000 speech celebrating the 
anniversary of Libyan Revolution, Qadhafi indicated his own ideological change of heart 
by declaring, “Now is the era of economy, consumption, markets, and investments.  This 
is what unites people irrespective of language, religion, and nationalities.”194  As Libyan 
analyst Ray Takeyh commented, “The hoary policies of subsidizing rebellions and 
plotting the overthrow of sovereign leaders have become unsustainable in the era of 
economic interdependence—even for oil rich Libya.”195
C. DOMESTIC POLITICS 
A final factor that may have influenced Libyan behavior change is domestic 
political pressure. Qadhafi experienced at least two major challenges to his rule:  first in 
1986, after the El Dorado Canyon air strikes, and then again in 1993, just prior to the UN 
decision to tighten sanctions against Libya (UNSCR 883)—both of which were staged by 
members of the Libyan army.196  In addition to the discontent expressed in these 
uprisings, Qadhafi’s regime felt pressure for change (1) as a result of the failure of the 
rentier-state structure, under sanctions, to deliver political complacency and (2) from 
middle class and technocratic calls for liberalization. 
 
192 Takeyh, 2001. 
193 “The World Just Got Safer. Give Diplomacy the Credit.” Washington Post, 11 January 2004 [information online]; available 
from Global NewsBank, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com> (accessed 19 August 2004). 
194 Takeyh, 2001.  
195 Ibid. 
196 Chris Hedges, “Qaddafi Reported to Quash Army Revolt.” New York Times, 23 October 1993, A5 [information online]; 
available from Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 24 August 2004). 
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As a rentier state,197 Tripoli needed income to placate the populace and quell 
domestic unrest.  The exchange of money for complacency was a pattern Qadhafi set 
early on in his tenure and would ultimately become a major problem under the sanctions 
regimes.  
For 35 years Colonel Qaddafi has used oil to buy allegiance from Libyans.  
In exchange for their turning a blind eye to the lack of representative 
government and human rights abuses, Colonel Qaddafi is openhanded in 
distributing Libya’s oil proceeds, sometimes as direct gifts to influential 
people and tribal leaders, but also in the form of state-financed health care, 
huge urban development projects, and universal free education.  But two 
decades of American and United Nations sanctions diminished Libyan oil 
revenues.198
 
As the Libyan population grew and oil prices declined, Qadhafi desperately needed the 
income that could only come through the petroleum sector and therefore had to make 
concessions to get multilateral sanctions lifted.199   
In addition of the failure of the Libyan rentier structure to deliver a placated 
populace, influential strata of Libyan society are calling for changes reflective of the ever 
evolving globalized world.   
An erratic socialist regime and two decades of economic sanctions have 
squandered Libya’s oil wealth and left it a backwater where little else is 
produced.  An increasingly alienated middle class is eager for jobs and 
visas.  And a new foreign-educated, technocratic leadership has embraced 
private enterprise, globalization and membership in the World Trade 
Organization as Libya’s newest creed.200  
 
 
197 A rentier state is one that relies upon externally generated monies, or rents, for income instead of extracting income from 
domestic production.  The rents are then distributed to the populace and tend to make up a significant portion of the gross domestic 
product (GDP).  Several Middle Eastern and African states, particularly those with large natural gas or petroleum resources, are 
considered rentier states, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, and Nigeria.  Also typical of rentier states is the presence of a non-
representative government and a colonial history.  Ahmet Kuru, “The Rentier State Model and Central Asian States: The Turkmen 
Case,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 1, No.1 (Spring 2002): 52-53. 
198 Geoff D. Porter, “The Faulty Premise of Pre-emption.”  New York Times, 31 July 2004 [information online]; available from 
Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.nexis.com> (accessed 24 August 2004). 
199 Ibid. 
200 Carla Anne Robbins, “In Giving up Arms, Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life.” Wall Street Journal. 
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Among those lobbying for change are Qadhafi’s own son, Saif el-Islam el-Qadhafi—the 
“public face of a Westernizing Libya”—and Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem, an 
American educated economist.201  During his recent tenure as Economics Minister then 
Prime Minister, Ghanem backed the Lockerbie settlement, successfully championed the 
liberalization of imports, and is pushing for free markets and smaller government.   
According to some, the introduction of satellite television and the internet during 
the nineties opened many Libyan eyes to the level of underdevelopment of their schools, 
hospitals, and airports.202  However subtly, the Libyan middle class is pushing for 
changes and for a better way of life for their children.  Many view improved relations 
with the United States in particular as key to a better future: 
Inside their homes, Libyans are more outspoken.  A mother of university-
age children complains that professors, and textbooks, are 30 years out of 
date.  The biggest complaint, especially among the young, is feeling 
trapped by a stagnant economy and a country still viewed in places as a 
pariah state. “I can study, but there are no jobs here when I finish…and 
it’s hard to get a visa to go abroad,” says an 18-year-old. “America has 
everything, and we want it.”203
 
D. THEORETICAL FINDINGS 
Before fully concluding this thesis, it is important to look back to the literature on 
influence theories and assess how the findings of this case study may validate or 
contradict the theories of deterrence, compellence, and engagement.    
1. Deterrence 
The basic cost-benefit element remains critical in any deterrence encounter and 
this case demonstrates the continued importance of raising costs through punitive 
measures.  Communication also remains critical and an influencing state must continue to 
identify the particular action that is unacceptable, signal resolve to punish that behavior, 
demonstrate resolve, and maintain a credible capability to enact any punishment.  These 
 
201 Ibid. 
202 Tyler, New York Times. 
203 Ibid. 
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measures support the target state’s process of cost-benefit weighing and should be viewed 
as necessary to affect successful deterrence. 
Despite the debate over the continued applicability of deterrence, this analysis 
demonstrates that it is still a viable influence strategy, even in the post-post-Cold War 
era.204  Deterrence worked in the case of terrorism, but failed in the case of weapons of 
mass destruction.  As discussed in chapter V, the reason for the different outcomes by 
issue may have been in the way deterrence was applied.  With terrorism, the U.S. and UN 
both applied sanctions to punish Libyan terrorist activity, and the U.S. continually 
threatened harsher punishments in the absence of Libyan compliance with international 
demands.  A more subtle approach was taken with regard to Libyan WMD activities.  
Though the U.S. applied the existing punitive measures to the WMD situation, there was 
not the same international support as in the terrorism case.  Further, the U.S. sought to 
resolve WMD concerns through international diplomatic efforts, such as the Paris 
Chemical Weapons Convention and other measures.  Though important diplomatic 
initiatives, they lacked the punitive nature of sanctions and may have been the reason for 
the failure of U.S. deterrence efforts to convince Tripoli to cease WMD production.   
2. Compellence 
Robert Art’s seven elements of compellence are very useful in analyzing a 
compellence or coercive effort between influencing and target states.  As he suggests, not 
all seven are required for a compellence policy to be successful. 205  As the Libya case 
demonstrated, the more critical elements of the compellence exchange between the U.S. 
and Libya were motivation to prevail, communicating a sense of urgency for compliance, 
and adequate international support.  Initially, Qadhafi had the greater motivation to 
prevail and compellence efforts to have him stop an action underway—namely support to 
 
 204  The “post-post-Cold War” era is a term coined by Secretary of State Colin Powell.  “In the United States, we tend to 
look at the world in "pre-September 11" and "post-September 11" terms. Post-September 11, it is clear that we live in what Secretary 
of State Colin Powell likes to call the post-post-Cold War world. This is an era defined by a number of realities, foremost among them 
American primacy, the low probability of great power conflict, and the spread of democracy and free market economics. But it is also 
a time of continuing regional threats, persisting widespread poverty and the exclusion of too many people from the benefits of 
globalization, and increasing transnational challenges.”  U.S. Department of State, Richard N. Haass, Directory, Policy Planning Staff,  
“U.S.-Russian Relations in the Post-Post-Cold War World,”  1 June 2002; available from http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/10643.htm; 
accessed 20 September 2004. 
205 George, 1991, 81.  Art argues the two most critical conditions for successful coercive diplomacy are the target’s fear of 
unacceptable escalation and the asymmetry of motivation in favor of the influencing state, 2003, 371-372. 
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terrorism and development of chemical weapons capability—failed in the short term.  
The U.S. government’s communicated sense of urgency for Libyan compliance began 
strong, faded with the first Bush Administration, and then built again in the Clinton and 
second Bush administrations.  This sense of urgency worked in tandem with Libya’s 
declining motivation to prevail to set the conditions for positive behavior change.  
Finally, international support, more so than domestic support, proved critical.  By gaining 
United Nations support in the case against Libya’s terrorist activities, U.S. punitive 
measures benefited from multilateral sanctions.  What U.S. sanctions may not have been 
sufficient to achieve in the long-term, isolation of the Qadhafi regime, became a long-
term reality with UN support.   
As described above, compellence efforts by both the United States and United 
Nations served to set the conditions for behavioral change by Libya; they did not, in and 
of themselves facilitate behavior change.  In fact, after conditions were set in the long-
term by U.S. and UN compellence efforts, conditional engagement was used to bring 
positive change.  As such, compellence efforts were a necessary, but insufficient element 
in Libyan behavior change.   
3. Engagement 
The Libya case validates the argument set forth by Haass and O’Sullivan that 
engagement does have a place in mixed influence strategies. 206  The Clinton and George 
W. Bush administrations both pursued a policy of conditional engagement in conjunction 
with deterrence and compellence.  Their engagement efforts combined positive economic 
and political incentives with threats of punishment in a road-map style that allowed for 
trust to be slowly built between the two countries and reciprocal steps to be verified.  The 
analysis here indicates that after punitive conditions had been set over an extended period 
of time, conditional engagement opened the door to positive Libyan behavior change 
with regard to both terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 
It is hard to believe that engagement alone, independent of other influence 
strategies, would have facilitated Libyan behavior change.  However, in the long-term, 
after conditions had been set by compellence efforts, conditional engagement comprised 
of incremental, positive political incentives, coupled with credible threats, worked to  
206 Haass and O’Sullivan, 160. 
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facilitate actual positive changes by the Libyan government.  In this case, engagement 
was a necessary, but insufficient element in positive behavior change. 
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is important that the United States be able to successfully influence rogue state 
behavior.  Not only do rogue states pose a near to long term threat to U.S. interests, 
successfully influencing them could prevent the United States from having to resort to 
war to influence international outcomes.  What can policy makers glean from this 
analysis to help them in formulating future influence efforts?  This thesis leads to three 
recommendations:   
(1) Sanctions can be effective in setting conditions for behavior change in rogue 
states; however, sanctions should be as multilateral as possible, preferable with United 
Nations backing.  As demonstrated in the Libya case, sanctions were effective in isolating 
Libya, thus setting the conditions for behavior change.  Because sanctions or other 
punitive measure can be critical to setting initial conditions, it is important that they be as 
effectively applied as possible.  One of the best ways to ensure effective application is 
through a multilateral approach.  With increasing globalization and different approaches 
to managing threats (engagement vs. coercion), unilateral U.S. sanctions alone may not 
be sufficient to isolate a regime economically and politically.   
(2) If punitive measures are used to set conditions for behavior change, these 
measures may require extended periods of time to be effective.  The primary punitive 
measures used by the U.S. against Libya were economic and diplomatic sanctions.  U.S. 
sanctions had been applied for 13 years and UN sanctions for seven years before Libya 
took the first steps towards meeting international demands regarding their support for 
terrorism.   
(3) Sticks alone may not result in positive behavior change by rogue states.  After 
appropriate conditions have been set, a carefully crafted engagement strategy should be 
used in conjunction with compellence and deterrence to facilitate behavior change.  With 
Libya, positive steps towards first renunciation of terrorism and later WMD did not 
happen until the U.S. modified its influence strategy and pursued limited conditional 
engagement.  With rogue states, engagement should be conditional, requiring very 
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specific and incremental reciprocal steps in exchange for positive incentives. Pursuing 
this kind of engagement allows for verification of actions and trust building by both 
sides.  Finally, it is important to remember that engagement was not pursued by the U.S. 
until the compellence and deterrence policy had set the conditions for Libyan behavior 
change. 
F. CONCLUSION 
U.S. influence strategy towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term 
success.  The compellence and deterrence policies established under President Reagan 
and strengthened by later administrations served to isolate Libya economically and 
diplomatically.  U.S. compellence and deterrence measures were oriented towards 
increasing the cost of Libyan support of terrorism and indigenous WMD programs 
through military strikes and economic and diplomatic isolation.  Tripoli’s own culpability 
in the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 served to work against any efforts to 
remove sanctions by galvanizing the international community against Libyan support to 
terrorism.  The Libyan government’s subsequent unwillingness to meet United Nation’s 
demands regarding support of terrorism in general, and the Pan Am and UTA bombings 
in particular, strengthened and extended UN sanctions, resulting in eleven years of 
multilateral isolation.  This isolation had major implications for the Libyan economy and 
stirred domestic discontent.   
The cumulative effect of the U.S. and UN sanctions was to set the conditions for 
Libyan behavior change.  This change began with the Clinton Administration’s 
introduction of limited conditional engagement.  After the Clinton Administration 
acceded to Libyan demands that the Pan Am 103 trial be held in a neutral third country, 
the Libyan government handed over the two suspects for trial.  This was the beginning of 
many small but concrete steps towards Libya’s reconciliation with the United States and 
the international community.  The George W. Bush Administration, benefiting from years 
of Libyan isolation and the positive response to conditional engagement, continued the 
engagement in an incremental fashion.  Backed up by credible, post-9/11 threats of 
forceful intervention, the Bush Administration clearly laid out the steps necessary for the 
removal of U.S. sanctions: acknowledgement of responsibility for the Pan Am 103 
bombing and payment of restitution to victim families, concrete evidence of a 
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renunciation of terrorism, and renunciation and disclosure of weapons of mass 
destruction programs.  Libya has taken actionable steps to demonstrate a change of policy 
concerning both terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.  Currently the U.S. and 
Libyan governments are in diplomatic discussions that will likely result in the removal of 
all remaining U.S. sanctions, including the release of $1.25 billion in frozen Libyan 
assets and direct air service between the two countries.207  Though Libya remains on the 
U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, Secretary Powell indicated 
they are making progress towards removal.  Speaking of the future and referencing the 
ongoing policy of incrementalized engagement, Powell is hopeful,  
…frankly, we’re impressed with what they have done in recent years: 
resolved the Pan Am 103 case, turned in all their weapons of mass 
destruction….We’ve laid out a clear roadmap for them of what we expect 
them to do in order to move toward full normalization of relations between 
the United States and Libya….The Libyans have been forthcoming.  We 
have been forthcoming….I think it’s in our interest to receive Libya back 
into the international community.208
 
G. THE WAY AHEAD 
As Secretary of State Powell stated, it is in the U.S. interest to bring Libya in from 
the cold.  Reconciling the relationship between the U.S. and Libya and reforming Qadhafi 
through other means than coercive war sends a message to the international community 
that the U.S. has more than one way to manage rogue states and will reward positive 
behavioral changes.  To stay on the road to reconciliation, the U.S. should stick to its 
slow but steady road-map approach to engagement and most importantly remain true to 
the strategy of using promised carrots and threatened sticks.  This will maintain the 
credibility of current and future influence efforts and allow for trust between the states to 
grow.  Finally, the U.S. government should tout this reconciliation with Qadhafi in public 
 
207 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Libyan Diplomatic Relations,” 23 April 2004; available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/31766.htm; accessed 5 September 2004.  As of 23 April 2004, the Bush Administration’s most 
recent easing of sanctions against Libya, two punitive measures remained: the freezing of Libyan assets, estimated at $1.25 billion and 
the lack of direct air service between the two countries. White House, “U.S. Eases Economic Embargo Against Libya,” 23 April 2004; 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040423-9.html; accessed 12 July 2004. 
208 U.S. Department of State, “Interview with Mr. Mohammed and Mr. Hudson of Reuters,” 26 April 2004; available from 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/31813.htm; accessed 6 September 2004. 
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and diplomatic circles.  In so doing, progress may be made in facilitating similar behavior 
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APPENDIX:  BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LIBYAN HISTORY AND 
QADHAFI’S FOREIGN POLICY 
A. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The history of the area known as Libya today is punctuated by Arab conquest and 
Islamization in the seventh century, Ottoman rule of the Maghrib beginning in the 
sixteenth century, and the establishment of the Sanusi religious order.  The Sanusi order, 
founded by Muhammad ibn Ali as Sanusi, was a fusion of Sufi mysticism and the 
doctrinal adherence of orthodox Islam.  The Sanusi religious order was significant in 
Libya in at least two ways.  First they had a lasting, unifying effect on the Bedouin tribes 
and second they were the order from which came the first leader of independent Libya, 
King Idris I.  
In 1911, the Ottomans clashed with Italians, who had set their eyes on Libya as a 
colonial prize, however secondary to other North African colonies.209  The Ottomans, 
being engaged elsewhere and on the verge of collapse, sued for peace with the Italians in 
1912.210  Though briefly independent, two of the three regions composing modern-day 
Libya, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were formally annexed by Italy.  It is fair to say the 
Italians did not fully comprehend the battle ahead of them.  The Bedouin tribes of the 
newly colonized region did not recognize the mandates of the 1912 Treaty of Lausanne, 
considering it a betrayal into the hands of infidels, and continued to fight, especially in 
Cyrenaica.211  The Sanusis proved the most organized resistance to the Italians; their first 
war, the Italo-Sanusi war (1914-1917) was incorporated into World War I.  Idris became 
leader of the Sanusis in 1916 and through British assistance, negotiated a truce with the 
Italians. 
The Italians ruled Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as separate colonies and their 
policies in each differed.  In 1920 the Italians recognized Idris as emir of Cyrenaica, 
acknowledging his political and religious leadership in that region; his leadership was 
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extended to Tripolitania in 1922.  As the government in Italy changed, so too did their 
policies toward Libya.  Mussolini’s policies in Libya were two-fold: “demographic 
colonization” and improvement of economic and transportation infrastructure.  Like the 
French in Algeria, Mussolini encouraged Italians to move to Libya to relieve Italian 
unemployment and overpopulation problems; likewise he encouraged the development of 
economic and transportation infrastructure to support the Italian-oriented economy in 
northern Libya.212  One of the most damaging policies to the Italian cause in Libya was 
the redistribution of “underutilized” Bedouin grazing lands to new Italian settlers.  
During World War II, Idris joined forces with the British in the hopes of achieving 
independence thereafter.  After much post-war wrangling over Libya’s future, the United 
Nations finally decided to transition the three regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and 
Fezzan to independence as a single sovereign state by 1952.   
The United Kingdom of Libya declared its independence on December 24, 1951 
with King Idris I as its chief of state.  King Idris was pro-Western in his foreign policy 
and opened the country to U.S. and British military basing.  Both western countries 
provided developmental aid until the discovery of oil in 1959.  It is noteworthy that 
during his rule, King Idris I was not active in the key Arab issues of the day, including 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.213  This lack of activism would become a problem for King 
Idris I during the mid-sixties and especially following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.  The 
youth of Libya were taken with Nasser’s Arab nationalism and agitated against Western 
influence in their country.  In addition to the youth of Libya, a growing urban elite was 
increasingly resentful of King Idris’ pro-Western and conservative-Arab leanings.214   
This disillusionment with the King’s foreign policy coupled helped establish the 
foundation for Qadhafi’s revolution and usher in the Free Officer Movement’s coup 
d’etat of September 1969. 
B. LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Upon coming to power in 1969, the Free Officers Movement formed a 12-
member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by 27-year-old Qadhafi, 
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whose purpose was running the government.  The RCC’s new policies were a clear break 
from those pursued by King Idris.  The RCC was against all forms of colonialism and 
imperialism; anti-Western, anti-Soviet, officially non-aligned, they were firmly dedicated 
to both Arab unity and the support of Palestine.   
In his book Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the U.S. Attack, Brian Davis argues that 
Qadhafi’s foreign policy is fueled by seven motivations:  regime survival, increasing the 
power and prestige of Libya throughout the world, Islam, pan-Arabism, hatred for Israel, 
anti-imperialism, and finally his revolutionary zeal.215  These motivations are clear in 
Qadhafi’s foreign policy ventures; each will be briefly examined below. 
Regime Survival.  Qadhafi took specific and violent measures to squelch both 
internal and external dissent; most notoriously he ordered the killing of many anti-regime 
Libyan expatriates, targeting those in Western Europe and America in particular.   
Increasing the Power and Prestige of Libya.  This he sought to do through the 
exportation of his revolution and his political philosophy, as articulated in The Green 
Book, and through support of insurgent and terrorist groups throughout the world.  In 
particular Qadhafi’s activities in Africa and the Mediterranean Basin are assessed to be 
drive from his desire to gain regional power.216
Islam.  Though Qadhafi used some level of Islamic rhetoric at the outset of his 
revolution, he began to shift away from Islam as a foundation as he increasingly 
embraced leftist ideologies.217   Some of his early activities in Africa, however, were 
fueled by a desire to spread Islam.   
Pan-Arabism.  It is clear by the formation of the revolutionary Free Officers 
Movement and the subsequent Revolutionary Command Council that Qadhafi and his 
cohorts were highly influenced by Nasser’s 1952 revolutionary overthrow of the 
Egyptian monarchy and subsequent Arab nationalist movement.  Qadhafi took up the 
banner of Pan-Arabism and is considered to be one of its greatest proponents. Qadhafi’s 
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vision of Arab unity was the formation of a loose federation similar to the U.S. or 
U.S.S.R.  Qadhafi is quoted as saying, 
…it is ironic to see that Americans and Soviets, who are not of the same 
origin, have come together to create united federations, while the Arabs, 
who are of the same race and religion, have so far failed to realize the 
most cherished goal of the present Arab generation.218
 
Qadhafi attempted to actualize this vision of a united Arab federation multiple 
times, including mergers with Egypt, Syria, and Morocco—none of which proved 
successful.  One of Qadhafi’s primary arguments for Arab unity was the belief that 
without a unified front, Arab nations would not be able to defeat Israel.219  
Hatred for Israel.  Hatred for Israel was likely one of the strongest motivations 
guiding Qadhafi’s foreign policy decision-making.  Though unable to defeat the Israelis 
militarily, Libya pursued other methods of opposing Israel, including terrorism, 
propaganda, and diplomacy.220   With the financial assistance of Saudi Arabia, Qadhafi 
was able to diminish Israeli influence throughout Africa—his perceived “sphere of 
influence”; Israeli isolation in Africa led to their subsequent isolation in the United 
Nations.  In Africa and elsewhere, Qadhafi supported other revolutionary, terrorist, and 
insurgent movements, including the PLO and the Palestinian rejectionist front in their 
efforts to destroy Israel.   
Anti-Imperialism. Qadhafi associated British and U.S. influence in Libya with 
Italian colonialism and imperialism.  Though the British had already left their military 
posts in Libya prior to the revolution, the U.S. had not; the U.S. withdrew from Wheelus 
Air Base by June 11, 1970—a date that subsequently became a Libyan national 
holiday.221  Another legacy of colonial involvement in Libya was through the oil 
industry.  Qadhafi began nationalizing the oil industry in 1971 with British Petroleum as 
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his first target; by 1974 he had nationalized 60% of Libya’s domestic oil production.222  
In another effort to purge the colonial influence in Libya, Qadhafi confiscated properties 
owned by Italian expatriates and expelled them from the country. 
Revolutionary Zeal.  Qadhafi manifested his zeal for the “Green Revolution” 
through support of revolutionary and insurgent groups around the world.  In the name of 
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